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The antiwar movement during the Civil War, led by the Peace Democrats and their 
more virulent cousins, the Copperheads, was remarkable from many perspectives.  First, 
their civil disobedience and political dissent largely remained well within constitutional 
boundaries, and the voting booth was their preferred battleground throughout the war.  
Second, during the unprecedented Civil War, at least unprecedented from an American 
perspective, executive wartime authorities expanded with the crisis, often abridging civil 
rights under the auspices of war.  Third, power lay mostly in the hands of the Radical 
Republicans, both at the national and state level, and the determination of what 
constituted acceptable and unacceptable dissent was theirs to make, often to the severe 
disadvantage of the Democrats.  Last, confronted with vote gerrymandering, vote rigging, 
voter intimidation, arrest without warrant and incarceration without trial, the Democrats 
behaved with restraint throughout, notwithstanding the aberration of the Sons of Liberty 
and possible Confederate collusion in 1864.  Pledged to a party platform of peace and 
immediate reconciliation with the estranged South, the Democrats remained unwavering 
from 1861-1865 in their opposition to Abraham Lincoln and the war. 
The following is their story.  Their rise and fall followed the trajectory of one man, 
Clement Laird Valladigham, and on him they relied for direction, inspiration and both 
thick and thin prospects of success.  To him was attributed much, and when he was 
arrested, tried and exiled to the South in 1863, the population of the North was attentive.  
Labeled as martyr and as a traitor, dependent on party affiliation, Valladigham remained 





The Copperheads, and Valladigham, remain relevant today.  Throughout the Civil 
War, they were obdurate protesters of what they saw as constitutional abuse and 
usurpation, and their protests continue to serve as a model for how to protest a war, as 








Clement Valladigham rose to prominence and power as people often do - he found his 
political feet in the Midwest and flexed them locally.  As the newspaper editor of the 
Dayton Daily Empire from 1847 - 1849,  his voice began to resonate in Democratic 
circles and word of him spread.   
The Copperheads began much as Valladigham had.  Hatched in the farmlands and 
granaries of the Midwest, they were conservative men.  The nation in 1850 certainly had 
its conflicts and tensions, but to these Midwesterners everything was working just fine 
and nothing needed to change.  Most of these men lived beyond the touch of slavery yet 
benefitted from its largess.  They traded up and down the Mississippi and sold their 
produce to their southern brethren and beyond.  The southern appetite for Midwestern 
grain and products led to northern prosperity, and so their partnership remained happy 
and largely undisturbed until the election of 1860.  
The politics and partisan passions of slavery that in 1860 drove the American nation 
to war with itself were characterized by the obdurate extremes of the Republican and 
Democratic parties.  Throughout the 1850s, a hopelessly polarized national debate raged, 





Congress.  Representatives and senators fulminated in the press, in congressional 
chambers and wherever a convenient bully pulpit could be found.  Stridency and 
invective defined the general political mood, and those political figures who had a gift for 
oratory and written public declamations rose in prominence to dominate the national 
debate.  One such politician was Clement Laird Valladigham. 
In a speech before the U.S. House of Representatives on the 14th of January 1863, 
Valladigham defended the right of the Confederacy to rebel, citing rebellion itself as a 
core principle and inherent right in American society.  Indeed, he claimed, “…your 
fathers were rebels, and your grandfathers…yet we, cradled ourselves in rebellion, and 
who have fostered and fraternized with every insurrection in the nineteenth century, 
everywhere throughout the globe, would now, forsooth, make the word ‘rebel’ a 
reproach.”1  Valladigham’s publicized sentiments became increasingly more strident 
following his departure from the House, and the distinction between what separated 
lawful dissent from sedition and active collusion with a hostile power became blurred by 
both nineteenth century and now twenty-first century standards.  Noting the politics and 
conduct of Valladigham from 1860-1864 offer a useful comparison as twenty-first 
century politics draw closer to the conditions, vitriol and potency of the Civil War period, 
a close examination of the motives, methods and outcomes of Clement Valladigham and 
the Copperheads is useful. 
This research will closely examine the political trajectory of the Democrats that 
identified themselves as Copperheads and their most prominent and controversial leader, 
 
1 Clement L. Valladigham, Speeches, Arguments,  Addresses and Letters of Clement L. Valladigham, (New 





Clement Valladigham, from the 1860 election of Lincoln to his reelection in 1864.  
Special scrutiny will focus on Valladigham’s congressional activities and partisan 
opposition to Lincoln, particularly from September 22nd, 1862,  the date of Lincoln’s 
announcement of the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, until his departure from 
Congress in early 1863.  Following his time in office, Valladigham engaged in more 
unrestrained and vitriolic opposition to the Lincoln administration, particularly as he 
denounced the war as unjust, wasteful and unwinnable.  Many of his claims in 1862 and 
early 1863 were factually supported, for the United States’ military prosecution of the 
war in the West had seemingly stalled at Vicksburg, and in the East had been 
characterized by an almost uninterrupted series of embarrassing defeats (the Confederate 
defeat at Antietam in 1862 was the one major exception to that claim).  Increasingly, the 
Union army required greater strength to counter the South, and in the spring of 1863, 
conscription became the Lincoln administration’s solution to that problem.   
There were many critics of the war in the North, but the most public was 
Valladigham.  As he and others routinely, and publicly, denounced the war in speeches, 
letters and publications, both the Republican-dominated Congress and the Lincoln 
administration became alarmed that the war’s detractors were harming recruitment and 
inspiring soldiers to desert.  On March 3rd, 1863, Abraham Lincoln, as he had done at 
different junctures throughout the war, suspended the writ of habeas corpus.  
Valladigham’s continued opposition and defiance of that decree led to his arrest by 
military authorities in May, his trial by military jury, conviction, incarceration in a federal 





The period spanning May 25th, 1863, the day of his deportation to the Confederacy, to 
his departure from Wilmington, North Carolina on June 17th on a blockade runner also 
deserves close examination.  During his exile in the South he was a subject of great 
interest to both sides of the conflict, and the unknown content of his interactions with 
notable Confederate officials led to later speculation in both the South and North. 
Of interest throughout this study will be his interaction, or lack thereof, with 
Confederate officials and other actors.  As a congressman, as a critic, an exile and later an 
expatriate living in Canada, the Confederate government saw Valladigham as potentially 
advantageous to their cause, at least in broad common purpose.  Yet very uncertain is the 
extent to which, if at all, Valladigham supplied the Confederates with information, or 
whether his activities remained consistently loyal to the Union, especially within the 
boundaries of loyalty that he pronounced and promoted.  Indeed, throughout his political 
and post-political life, Valladigham tested the limits, and the very definition, of loyalty. 
With what frequency and in what capacity did Clement Valladigham communicate, 
while a member of Congress, with like-minded political figures in the South, or did he 
not do so at all until his period of exile?  Apart from the public accusations and private 
concerns of the Lincoln administration, was his anti-war rhetoric helpful to the 
Confederacy, as Lincoln and the Radical Republicans claimed, especially as the 
government of Jefferson Davis actively courted European sympathy, markets and direct 
aid?   During Valladigham’s exile in the South, who did he meet with and why?  Did he 
aid and abet the enemy, as his critics in the North claimed, or were his activities benign 
and merely parallel with mainstream southern thinking?  Once his exile to the South had 





agents, but did he do so to assist the Confederacy?  If not, then why did they meet?  Is 
there concrete evidence of subsequent coordination against the United States 
government?   
Clement Valladigham was a central oppositional figure to the Lincoln administration 
and its policies.  The viability and political attractiveness of Copperhead opposition to the 
war rose and fell with Valladigham, and a full understanding of why and how the 
Copperheads failed and when they failed is inextricably tied to Valladigham.  By 1864, as 
the presidential election loomed and political platforms were refined, the radicalism of 
Valladigham and the Copperheads was too much for the Democratic Party nominee, 
George B. McClellan.   He rejected the political platform built and controlled by 
Valladigham, and then innocuously merged his amended political message with Abraham 
Lincoln’s broader strategy for war and reunification and lost. 
The Copperheads, and Valladigham, remain relevant today.  From 1861-1865, they 
were obdurate protesters of what they saw as constitutional abuse and usurpation, and 
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Chapter 1 
Rise of the Antiwar Democrats and Clement Valladigham, 1860-1863 
 
On November 6th, 1860, Abraham Lincoln was elected president and the nation 
fractured. The many political campaigns leading up to the election had long telegraphed 
the party platforms and personal positions of the many candidates, but of acute concern to 
regional voters had been the two principle contenders; Lincoln, a Republican and Stephen 
Douglas, a Democrat. Lincoln had secured the Republican nomination and was, from the 
outset, whether true or not, indelibly associated with the dissolution of slavery.   
The Democrats were far more divided.  In his 1977 book A Respectable Minority:  
The Democratic Party in the Civil War Era, Joel Silbey emphasizes how deeply divided 
the Democrats were in 1860.  Contrary to the broad Republican resolve to stop the 
expansion of slavery, the Democrats had no national consensus on major issues.  The 
Democrats of the South were adamantly pro-slavery and believed their continued 





northern Democrats saw themselves as conservative Constitutionalists and staunch 
Unionists and therefore would not endorse the southern insistence on ensured expansion.1  
Douglas, an advocate of popular sovereignty, believed the territories should be 
free to choose whether to be admitted as slave states or free ones.  In Freeport, Illinois, 
during the second Lincoln-Douglas debate in what would later be called his Freeport 
Doctrine, Douglas declared each state and territory should decide for themselves whether 
to introduce or exclude slavery. 2  Throughout the course of the seven Lincoln-Douglas 
debates, he accused Lincoln and his fellow Republicans of siding with the abolitionists 
and seeking equality for African Americans.  Douglas asserted “ If you desire negro 
citizenship, if you desire them to vote on an equality with yourselves, and to make them 
eligible to office, to serve on juries, and to adjudge your rights, then support Mr. Lincoln 
and the Black Republican Party.” 3  
The scholarship on Douglas is divided over one fundamental question:  Was 
Douglas for or against slavery?  In an article published in 2005 in the Journal of the 
Abraham Lincoln Association, Graham Peck examines the historiography of Douglas and 
noted most Douglas scholars agree he was personally opposed to slavery.  But Peck 
highlights the political ambivalence of Douglas on slavery issues.  Douglas supported the 
repeal of the Missouri Compromise.  Yet he disagreed with the Supreme Court Dred 
Scott vs. Sanford decision that declared Congress had no ability to regulate slavery in the 
territories.   He indirectly owned a plantation with slaves through his father-in-law and 
 
1 Joel Silbey,  A Respectable Minority: The Democratic Party in the Civil War Era, 1860-1868, (New 
York, Norton Publishing, 1977), 3-5. 
2 Doris Kearns Goodwin, Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln, (New York, Simon 
and Schuster, 2005), 203. 





personally profited from that enterprise throughout the 1850s.  In short, there is certainly 
some evidence that as a conservative Constitutionalist he supported slavery, but his 
stance on the issue fell short of the mark required by the southern Democrats, a point 
made by Jefferson Davis in the run-up to the 1860 election.4 
Douglas secured the Democratic nomination only following the second of two 
very acrimonious nominating conventions, the first ending without resolution in 
Charleston, South Carolina in April of 1860.  The majority of southern Democrats left the 
hall prior to voting, angered that Douglas continued to embrace the popular sovereignty 
doctrine that would allow the territories to decide the issue of slavery and thus leave 
slavery’s future uncertain.   Absent the needed votes to nominate anyone, the convention 
was adjourned.  
In the aftermath of the Charleston convention, the Richmond Enquirer on May 
15th  summarized the southern complaint:  “The most plausible argument to silence the 
demand of Southern Democrats for a full and unequivocal recognition of the 
constitutional rights of persons and properties in the Territories, seems to have assumed 
the following stereotyped form: “…wherever slave labor can be profitably employed, it 
will find its permanent existence, as effectively under the laissez faire system as under 
any system of governmental protection; and wherever such labor cannot be profitably 
employed, no system of protection will maintain its existence.” 5 
 
4 Graham A. Peck, Was Stephen A. Douglas Anti-Slavery? Volume 26, Issue 2, Summer 2005, Journal of 
the Abraham Lincoln Association, 1-21. 





 The second Democratic convention on June 18th in Baltimore was more 
successful, at least for Douglas.  The disaster of the Charleston convention was only 
narrowly avoided in Baltimore, and in the aftermath his selection led to a permanent 
schism within the party.  It divided into two very separate branches, the Southern 
Democrats and the Northern Democrats.  The Southern Democrats wanted the assurance 
of slavery’s expansion from their candidate, and so nominated sitting Vice President John 
C. Breckinridge. The Northern Democrats embraced Douglas.  Now divided and 
weakened, the Democrats could do little to stop Lincoln’s election.  Silbey quotes 
Senator Preston King of New York, who wrote in May, following the Charleston 
convention, “The power and prestige of the democratic party is broken and gone 
forever.” 6 
Led by South Carolina on December 20th, 1860, eleven states ultimately seceded 
from the Union, seven within a span of 45 days.  Yet the issue of armed conflict remained 
abstract for many well into 1861, and most people in the United States yearned for the 
restoration of the Union, so long as their pro or anti-slavery demands were granted. 
Gideon Welles, Lincoln’s Secretary of the Navy, wrote in his diary a retrospective 
account of that period before Fort Sumter: “The atmosphere was thick with treason.  
Party spirit prevailed, however, amidst these accumulating dangers.  Democrats to a large 
extent sympathized with the rebels more than with the administration, not that they 
wished secession to be successful and the Union divided, but they hoped that Lincoln and 
 





the Republicans would prove failures.”  He went on to also note that “Neither party 
realized to any extent the gathering storm.” 7  
Frank L. Klement, Jennifer Weber and Silbey, three modern authors of seminal 
works on the Copperheads, agree the Copperheads were, from the outset, deeply 
conservative midwestern Democrats invested in the Union as it had always been and 
resentful of any threat to the status quo.  They rejected secession by the southern states, 
but also rejected what they saw as the belligerent entrenchment of the Republicans led by 
the Lincoln administration and saw it as only exacerbating divisions between North and 
South. In the months following Lincoln’s election and preceding his inauguration on 
March 4th, 1861, the Democrats, regardless of faction, were largely the same in goal and 
method.  Led by Douglas, the Northern Democrats were desperate to impede the 
Republican’s ideological pronouncements and accompanying rhetoric. 8 Summarizing the 
new Democratic mantra, Clement Valladigham declared in the aftermath of the election 
that the Democrats were “Defeated but not conquered”. 9 The new party agenda between 
December 1860 and April 1861 was simple – preserve the union but avoid war.   
In a letter to R. H. Henderson of Ohio on May 13th, 1861, Valladigham included a 
speech by Douglas the previous March in which he had declared: “War is final, eternal 
separation.  Hence, disguise it as you may, every Union man in America must advocate 
 
7 Gideon Welles, The Civil War Diary of Gideon Welles: Lincoln’s Secretary of the Navy, Original 
Manuscript Edition, Edited by William E. Gienapp and Erica L. Gienapp, Urbana and (Chicago, The 
University of Illinois Press, 2014), 244. 
8 Frank L. Klement, The Copperheads in the Middle West, (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 
1960),31-33; Silbey, A Respectable Minority, 2-6; Jennifer Weber, Copperheads: The Rise and Fall of 
Lincoln’s Opponents in the North, (New York,  Oxford University Press, 2006), 3-7. 





such amendments to the Constitution as will preserve peace and restore the Union;…” 10 
The Detroit Free Press on December 11th, 1860 framed the Democratic argument and 
strategy best: “The integrity of the country is the first great, absorbing issue….We are 
ready to act with any and every man of whatever party, faith or section, who is for the 
perpetuity of the Constitution and the Union.” 11 
The midwestern Democrats rejected attempts by others to label them as either 
northerners or southerners.  To best illustrate that point, Klement cited the closing 
remarks in a pro-western speech given by Valladigham before the House of 
Representatives on December 15th, 1859: “ …I am not a Northern man, nor yet a 
Southern man; but I am a Western Man by birth, by habit, by education; and although 
still a United States man with United States principles, yet within and subordinate to the 
Constitution, am wholly devoted to Western interests….I became and am a Western 
sectionalist, and so shall continue until the day of my death.”  12  But perhaps most 
presciently, the Democrats saw themselves as stable protectors of the Constitution and 
the regional balance and roles defined, and codified, within it.  In the same speech, 
Valladigham declared “…Is it not, I appeal to you, better than for you of the North, better 
for you of the South, better for us of the West, better for all of us, that this Union shall 
endure forever?  Sir, I am for the Union as it is, and the Constitution as it is.  I am against 
disunion now, and forever; …” 13 
 
10 Clement L. Valladigham, Speeches, Arguments and Letters of Clement L. Valladigham, (New York, J. 
Walter and Company, 1864), 303. 
11 Silbey, A Respectable Minority, 34. 
12 Klement, The Copperheads in the Middle West, 6; Valladigham, Speeches, Arguments and Letters of 
Clement L. Valladigham, 210. 





The Lincoln administration and Republicans, especially the most strident 
Republicans led by Thaddeus Stevens, shared the Northern Democrats resolve to the save 
the Union, but rejected any attempt to allow the further expansion of slavery in the 
territories.  President-elect Lincoln agreed to the continued enforcement of the Fugitive 
Slave Act but was adamant that slavery would not expand westward.  In a letter to 
Senator Lyman Trumbull from Illinois on December 10th, 1860, Lincoln wrote: “Let 
there be no compromise of the issue of extending slavery.  If there be, all our labor is lost, 
and, ere long, must be done again.  This dangerous ground – that into which some of our 
friends have a hankering to run – is popular sovereignty.  Have none of it.  Stand firm. 
The tug has come, and better now, than any time hereafter.” 14 
Further, it was clear well before the firing on Fort Sumter that the North was 
prepared to answer aggression with aggression and on the issue of slavery Lincoln saw 
containment as the only possible goal, effectively eliminating any grounds for 
compromise.    In a speech enroute to Washington on February 12th, 1861 in Indianapolis, 
Indiana, one that received widespread distribution in papers throughout the North and 
South, President-elect Lincoln addressed the issue of rebellion following the failure of the 
Crittenden Compromise.  Lincoln declared: “... Upon principle, on what rightful principle 
may a State, being no more than one-fiftieth part of the nation in soil and population, 
break up the nation and then coerce a proportionally larger subdivision of itself in the 
most arbitrary way?  What mysterious right is conferred on a district of country, with its 
people merely calling it a State?” 15  Previous public statements by the president-elect on 
 
14 Edna Greene Medford, Lincoln and Emancipation, (Carbondale, Southern Illinois University Press, 
2015), 31,32; John Nicolay and John Hay, Works of Abraham Lincoln, Volume 4, (Harrogate, Lincoln 
Memorial University, 1894, 149. 





the issue of secession had been vague and of little consequence, confusing and 
disappointing many throughout the Union, especially in the North.  But this one grabbed 
everyone’s attention, and reactions to it both North and South - and West - were swift.  
On February 15th, the Richmond Enquirer editor declared:  “Holding that a state 
possesses no sovereignty whatever – no more sovereignty than a county – Mr. Lincoln 
deems it his duty to repress, by force of arms, if necessary, any exercise; or, as he would 
term it, any usurpation of sovereignty by State authority.” 16  The New York Herald was 
more circumspect: “ The [following] speech, delivered by the President elect, at 6:50 
P.M. from the balcony of the Bates House, to an assemblage of at least twenty thousand 
people, is of the greatest significance, although it deals more in intimations than in 
definite assertions. The fact that it was carefully prepared in Springfield, and brought 
here in manuscript, fully shows the meaning the Presidential speaker intended to give 
it.”17 
Dedicated to avoiding disunion at any cost, the Democrats, and some former 
Whig Republicans, offered proposals, amendments and compromises.  Apart from the 
Crittenden Compromise of December 1860, which would have ensured slavery’s 
permanent enshrinement in the Constitution and prohibited any future move by Congress 
to abolish it, one proposal was particularly representative of the range of measures 
considered by the Democrats.18     
 
16 Richmond Enquirer, Feb 15th, 1861, 2. 
17 New York Herald, Feb 15th, 1861, 5. 
18 David M. Potter, The Impending Crisis: America Before the Civil War, 1848-1861, (New York, Harper 





An Ohio congressman and Whig Republican, Thomas Corwin, proposed an 
amendment designed to assure the South that “no amendment shall be made to the 
Constitution which will authorize or give Congress the power to abolish or interfere, 
within any state, with the domestic institutions thereof, including that of persons held to 
labor or service by the laws of said states.” It passed both houses of Congress (133-65 in 
the House and 24-12 in the Senate) and was dutifully forwarded by Lincoln to the states 
for ratification on March 16th, 1861.  Two states ratified the proposed amendment – Ohio 
and Maryland – prior to the firing on Fort Sumter on April 12th. 19  For obvious reasons, 
hostilities ended the ratification process, but it is important to note two points.  First, the 
vote reflected the enduring entrenchment and widespread acceptance of slavery in the 
nation. The vote highlighted the stark difference between approval for the continuance of 
slavery where it existed in 1861, which had large support across the political divide, and 
approval for the extension of slavery into territories where it did not yet exist in 1861, an 
issue bitterly contested and the principle reason for Lincoln’s election and southern 
secession. Second, perhaps more ominously, had the firing on Fort Sumter not occurred, 
and the ratification process continued, it is possible it would have met the 2/3rds 
threshold for state ratification and thus become the Thirteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution.  
On the 4th of March, Abraham Lincoln was inaugurated as president.  In his 
inaugural speech, he adopted a conciliatory tone, but was adamant the Union would 
“hold, occupy and possess the property and places belonging to the United States 
government.”  He further declared the Union was immutable and that to secede was 
 





impossible, stating “the Union of these states is perpetual…and that the Union will 
endure forever.”  He also emphasized the Union would not attack unless it was attacked, 
and the use of arms against the Union would be met with force. 20 
He affirmed that slavery would be protected in the states where it already existed 
and although he questioned the advisability and morality of the fugitive slave laws, he 
assured the South they would be enforced in accordance with the Constitution.  He 
offered a lengthy exploration of the common complaints that divided the nation and 
hoped that cooler heads would ultimately recognize the sanctity of the Constitutional 
compact and return to it.  Last, he closed with the following: 
I am loath to close.  We are not enemies, but friends.  We must not be 
enemies.  Though passion may have strained it must not break our bonds of 
affection. The mystic chords of memory, stretching from every battlefield 
and patriot grave, to very living heart and hearthstone all over this broad 
land, will yet swell the chorus of the Union, when again touched, as surely 
they will be, by the better angels of our nature.  
 
 The nation listened, and interpretations predictably followed regional and party 
leanings.  In the North, the reaction was varied.  The New York Herald was unimpressed 
with the President’s speech: 
It would have been almost as instructive if President Lincoln had contented 
himself with telling his audience, yesterday, a funny story and let them go.  
His inaugural is but a paraphrase of the vague generalities contained in his 
pilgrimage speeches, and shows clearly, either that he has not made up his 
mind respecting his future course, or else that he desires, for the present, to 
keep his intentions to himself…  A resolve to procrastinate, before 
committing himself, is apparent throughout…Filled with careless bonhomie 
as this first proclamation to the country of the new President is, it will give 
 






but small contentment to those who believe that not only its prosperity, but 
its very existence is at stake. 21 
The New York Daily Tribune, although left uncertain by what it viewed as the 
vagueness of the President’s will, was more supportive of Lincoln:  
…The Address can not fail to exercise a happy influence upon the country.  
The tone of almost tenderness with which the South is called upon to return 
to her allegiance, can not fail to convince even those who differ from Mr. 
Lincoln that he earnestly and seriously desires to avoid all difficulty and 
disturbance, while the firmness with which he avows his determination to 
obey the simple letter of his duty, must command the respect of the whole 
country, while it carries the conviction of his earnestness of purpose, and of 
his courage to enforce it. 22 
In Ohio, the Cleveland Morning Leader was effusive in its praise for Lincoln’s 
address, stating:  “The entire inaugural is so condensed and so convincing that no 
synopsis can do it justice.  It is brief and direct to the point, and is worthy of being 
preserved among the ablest State papers of the American people.  23 
  Even the staunchly Democratic Cincinnati Daily Press admired the address, 
perhaps reading into it an intent that missed what Lincoln thought or intended: 
The inaugural address of the President seems admirably adapted to allay the 
apprehensions of the people of every section of the country. The people of 
the South are assured that their constitutional and local rights will be held 
sacred by his Administration; and all the constitutional guarantees to their 
peculiar domestic relation fulfilled to the letter, without evasion or 
hypocritical interpretation. They are also assured that, under the 
Constitution, there can be no coercion of States, but that his duty is simply 
to see that the laws are faithfully observed by the people in every State, and 
that this duty will be executed.  24 
 
 
21 New York Herald, March 5th, 1861, 5. 
22 New York Daily Tribune, March 5th, 1861, 4. 
23 The Cleveland Morning Leader, March 5th, 1861,5. 





Reaction throughout the South was very different.  Newspapers were uniform in 
rejecting any optimism and saw Lincoln’s tone as threatening.  The Richmond Enquirer 
declared on the 5th of March: 
Mr. Lincoln’s inaugural address is before our readers – couched in the cool, 
unimpassioned, deliberate language of the fanatic, with the purpose of 
pursuing the promptings of fanaticism even to the dismemberment of the 
Government with the horrors of civil war. Virginia has long looked for and 
promised peace offering before her – and she has more, she has the denial 
of all hope of peace.  Civil war must now come. 25 
The Daily Dispatch in Richmond said much the same:  “The inaugural address of 
Abraham Lincoln inaugurates civil war, as we have said from the beginning….the 
Demon of Coercion stands unmasked. The sword is drawn and the scabbard thrown 
away. 26 
A month later, on April 12th, Fort Sumter was fired upon by the Confederacy and 
surrendered the following day.  The reaction in the North was swift and uniformly 
resolute across party lines.  All hope of negotiated peace or at worst, peaceable disunion, 
dissipated and the resolve for war took shape. 27 The Democrats and the Republicans 
briefly united as they rallied to counter the belligerence of the South.  Gideon Welles 
noted  “The Democrats generally as well as the Republicans are offering themselves to 
the country.” 28  There were calls for the suspension of political parties while the nation 
engaged in war.  Silbey quotes Albert Riddle in his Recollections of Wartime, 1860-1865, 
where Riddle observed “…the purposes of the war the Administration party…really 
becomes the nation. There can only be two parties, that of the union and one that supports 
 
25 Richmond Enquirer, March 5th, 1861, 2. 
26 Richmond Daily Dispatch, March 5th, 1861, 2. 
27 Weber, Copperheads, 13. 





the rebels” 29  Douglas largely said the same:  “There can be but two parties, the party of 
patriots and the party of traitors.  We [Democrats] belong to the former.”   For a brief 
period, most Democrats agreed.  Still led by Douglas until his death in June of 1861, the 
Democratic party remained intact, but fractures were beginning to form. 30  
The Republicans welcomed the initial support of the Democrats for limited war 
support and troop mobilization but also saw it as vaguely threatening to their political 
momentum in the North.  Intent on neutralizing the Democrats, the Republicans argued a 
one-party system was the only patriotic way to support the nation in time of crisis, 
viewing any failure to support the Lincoln administration and its prosecution of the war 
as sedition.  Silbey emphasizes the idea was first promoted by the Republicans in the 
months following Fort Sumter.  They proposed the organization of a Union party, one 
that would combine all men, regardless of previous party affiliation, into a single political 
organization. 31  Many Democrats endorsed the idea. In the New York Daily Tribune on 
September 15th, 1861, B.F. Hallett, a Massachusetts Democrat, exhorted his fellow 
Democrats to come in line with the Republican war effort and to eschew party politics 
while the nation was at war.  He stated: “…in their judgement, a party nomination is 
necessary, but after having been a strict party-man all my life long, and never failed to 
deposit the whole ticket of my party in any election, I can see in this greatest of all perils 
of my country, a duty so much higher than party, that it is easy to forget I ever belonged 
to any party.”  Hallett ended by urging his fellow Democrats at the upcoming Worcester 
Convention in Massachusetts to “…go no further than to continue its State Committee for 
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future organization when necessary, plant itself firmly and rightly in support of the "War" 
for Union under the Constitution and make no nominations.” 32   Lincoln did his part to 
foster goodwill by appointing Edwin Stanton, a Democrat, to his cabinet on January 20th, 
1862. 33  But Democratic acquiescence to Republican war-time authority, however named 
and however conditional, was by no means shared by all within the party.   
Acceptance of a one-party system required a cessation of dissent, and although 
the Democrats were as enraged by the assault on Fort Sumter as their Republican rivals, 
to not challenge the Republicans on the many other issues dividing the Union seemed 
disloyal to the principles and fundamentals of American democracy. Silbey cites the 
Detroit Free Press on the 10th and later the 16th of August, writing of the Democrats that 
they could not “endorse” the “blunders, incompetence and dishonesty of the republican 
officials.”  It went on to declare the party should not disband.  “The mission of the 
Democratic Party has not been fulfilled. It still has the Constitution to protect and the 
Union to restore.”  Last, the Free Press stated it was “of the opinion that no alternative 
remains but to make a bold, inflexible fight on all quarters…If we do not succeed in this 
way we are doomed to failure.” 34 
There were other, equally influential events that led to the end of the period of 
political peace in the North.  Klement cites the profound economic collapse in the 
Midwest that resulted from the severing of traditional trade relationships and 
opportunities with the South, compounded by the southern blockade of the Mississippi 
River.  Pre-war investments in southern bonds rapidly depreciated and were then 
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worthless, resulting in widespread bank failures.  Prices soared while markets for 
midwestern goods became harder and more expensive to reach. The result was a 
depressed market for midwestern agricultural commodities.  Midwesterners saw their 
economic hardship as avoidable and directly attributable to irresponsible market 
manipulation by northeasterners.  But central to their wrath was Lincoln, for had the war 
not started, the lucrative trade with the South would have continued, banks would have 
remained solvent and the Mississippi River would have been unchallenged and a reliable 
route for export.35   
The railroads became the only reliable source of east-west transportation, and 
those railroads were quick to raise their prices, an act vilified by the midwestern 
Democrats, now led by Valladigham.  The price of rail transport did double, rising from 
$1.20 a barrel in July 1861 to $3.00 by January 15th, 1862.  Compounding the hardship 
was the Morrill Tariff Act of March 2nd, 1861, signed into law on the eve of President 
Lincoln’s inauguration by outgoing President Buchanan. 36 
The historiography of the Morrill Tariff Act and the subsequent two tariffs 
enacted by Congress later in 1861 is conflicted.  The need for funds to fill the depleted 
federal coffers was acute in 1861.  Klement, Silbey and Weber agree the three tariffs 
were driven by a genuine need for federal revenue to fund the war but differ on the 
impact they had on the Midwest.  Forgotten in the Democrat’s excoriation of Lincoln and 
Chase was that both men were from the Midwest and that war, no matter how needed or 
unnecessary it was judged to be, is expensive. 
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Klement contends the tariffs primarily benefited the industrial interests of New 
England and Pennsylvania.   The tariffs were only imposed on imported goods from 
Europe and were designed to stimulate industry and production in the United States.  
Since the preponderance of that industry was centered in the Northeast, it is logical that 
its greatest benefit would be there.  In part for that reason, and more importantly because 
southern cotton had been the dominant export to Europe from the United States since the 
1830’s, the South had historically resisted tariffs.  Klement notes the Morrill Tariff was 
enacted only after the secession of seven of the southern states, states that had previously 
been allied with the Midwest in promoting free trade and resisting tariffs. With southern 
resistance removed, the tariff passed over the objections of the Midwest. 37   
Weber contends the financial woes of the Midwest were not isolated, and that 
across the North in post-war 1861 and early 1862 prices rose rapidly, achieving an 
inflation rate of 13% annually that remained at that level throughout the war. Weber 
insists the only area doing well economically in late 1861 was the nascent military-
industrial sector, and that as the war progressed, prices stabilized and the western farmers 
ultimately fared well. 38    
Silbey views the tariffs through a strictly political lens and notes the tariffs and 
accompanying financial measures were mere continuations of similar Republican efforts 
begun prior to the war and only enabled by the removal of the Democrat-aligned southern 
voting bloc in Congress.  Silbey also observes the Morris Tariff Act was not alone in 
angering the Democrats.  Republican efforts to redistrict the congressional voters in Ohio 
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was another, and in Michigan, after war commenced, Democrats were accused by 
Republicans of colluding with southerners.  Further heightening tensions, in early 1862, 
Democrat Jesse Bright of Indiana was expelled from the Republican-controlled Senate 
for what were clearly political reasons.  Regardless of primary cause, Democratic anger 
towards the Republicans deepened by 1862. 39 
Important to note was the loss of all federal income related to the cotton industry.  
The dominant export from the United States, cotton had created a vibrant, interconnected 
supply and transport system, ranging from the slave clothing industry in Rhode Island to 
the northern ships that carried the cotton to foreign ports. The collapse of those industries 
in the North contributed to the economic malaise in 1861 and 1862. 40    
In the introduction to Inside Lincoln’s Cabinet: The Diaries of Salmon P. Chase, 
David Donald adds a more balanced perspective to what then was an acidic partisan 
battle.  He notes the nation was, at the outset of war, broke.  The Buchanan 
Administration had both drained national coffers and, in obedience to southern demands 
for a tariff favorable to its interests in 1857, failed to refill them.  To wage any war is 
expensive, and this war was particularly so given a large chunk of the nation that had 
previously produced revenue was now gone.  Money had to be generated from a 
combination of loans and tariffs, with the initial weight (3/4) in loans.  Donald 
emphasizes Chase recognized the dire condition of the United States economy and took 
reasonable, albeit flawed measures to fix the problem. 41 
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By late 1861, Valladigham had largely become the voice, if not the control, of the 
midwestern anti-war Democrats following Douglas’ death.  In Congress, Valladigham, 
was quick to lead the opposition in denouncing the tariffs.  In a speech to Congress in 
December, six months after Douglas’ untimely death, he conceded the Democrats lacked 
the political clout to rescind the tariffs, but wanted to note for posterity the problems the 
tariffs had caused in the West:  
You have shut up, blockaded, the Mississippi for us; and more effectually 
too, than any port on the southern coast…Cut off as we are from other 
means of outlet except by way of the lakes, and thus, in part, through a 
foreign country, and with our railroads leading to the east, for the most part 
on the hands of eastern directors or bondholders, the tariffs of freights has 
at the same time been fully doubled…to make matters still worse…the 
Baltimore and Ohio railroad, has been closed for all purposes of travel and 
transportation for the last six months and it seems almost impossible for 
some cause – surely not “military necessity”, but shall I say base selfishness 
on the part of the more northern or eastern or rival roads?- to procure the 
opening of it upon any terms. 42  
   
The three authors who have written the most extensively about the Copperheads, 
Klement, Silbey and Weber, largely agree on what tensions led to the fracturing of the 
Democrats and the emergence of a separate Copperhead agenda, but they tend to differ 
on what constituted the primary motivation that led to the split within the party.  Klement 
is adamant the economic frustration and perceived isolation of the Midwest, and their 
belief that the East was to blame for it, prompted Copperheads to declare themselves as a 
separate political force in the North.  43  Silbey contends it was the political intransigence 
of the Republicans, entrenched in a war-centric policy that the Republicans then claimed 
necessitated full obedience to the Federal cause, better translated as the Lincoln 
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administration and Republican cause.  Democrats who supported the Republican war 
policy became quickly estranged from those Democrats who did not. 44  Weber, in what 
is the most recent study of the Copperheads, contends it was the flagrant disregard for the 
Constitution by Lincoln that galled the anti-war Democrats most.  From the outset, the 
failure to consult Congress in declaring war, the failure to consult Congress in raising the 
initial levy of 75,000 troops and the unilateral move by the executive branch to begin 
funding the war, again without consulting Congress, inflamed and united the anti-war 
Democrats from the beginning. That Congress had not been in session when those actions 
occurred, and that the exigencies of immediate war required extraordinary action was a 
point ignored by the Democrats. 45  All three authors may disagree on the main stressor 
for the ultimate split, but all fully agree on the timing - the announcement of the 
preliminary Emancipation Proclamation on September 22nd, 1862.  
Largely quieted by the popular support for the war from its beginning in 1861 
until the summer of 1862, the anti-war Democrats enjoyed a resurgence in popularity 
following military reversals in both the East and West, setbacks that produced thousands 
of casualties and for the first time raised doubts in the North that the war could be won.  
The optimism that had initially led to the bumbling Union disaster at Manassas had been 
rekindled with successive Union victories in the West, but by July 1862 that ardor was 
rapidly ebbing.  Enormous battlefield casualties during the Valley and Peninsula 
Campaigns in Virginia, as well as the bloodbath at Shiloh in the West, had left the North 
stunned by the grim realities of sustained war.  Those losses were exacerbated by 
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expiring enlistments, and popular resistance to the Lincoln administration’s requests for 
additional troops grew accordingly.  Beginning with the Militia Act in June of 1862, 
designed to allow the federal government to mobilize state militias for up to nine months, 
the Copperheads found growing public support for their protests. 
From well before Lincoln’s election, the Democrats had claimed the Republican 
Party’s central motive was to end slavery.  Lincoln’s announcement of his Preliminary 
Emancipation Proclamation on September 22nd, 1862 confirmed their suspicions.  But 
either not understood or considered by Valladigham and the Copperheads were the 
complex politics of a war that had not gone well for the North.  The combined southern 
victories in the East, the apparent military stalemate in the West and the political 
overtures of the Confederate government to foreign powers were too much for the 
Lincoln administration to ignore for long.   
The war in the East, prior to the Battle of Antietam, had been one of continuous 
disappointment in the North.  In the months prior to Union General George B. 
McClellan’s ill-fated Peninsula Campaign, Confederates in the Shenandoah Valley, led 
by General Thomas Jackson, had routed numerically larger Union forces on four separate 
battlefields, maneuvering with a speed and skill that not only cleared Union forces from 
the western portion of Virginia, but also threatened the city of Washington itself.  East of 
the Shenandoah, McClellan’s excessive caution in the field had been exploited by the 
tactically gifted and bold General Robert E. Lee.  Confederate forces had repeatedly 
struck numerically superior Union forces during the Peninsula Campaign in the spring of 
1862.  Although tactically defeated in several of the battles, the Confederates had 





of Malvern Hill, the campaign ended with a costly Confederate loss, but the ferocity with 
which the Confederates had attacked the Federal forces throughout persuaded McClellan 
that he was outnumbered and in danger, and so he decided to withdraw his forces. 
Frustrated by McClellan’s failure, Lincoln invested his hopes in the ostensibly 
bolder General John Pope and passed overall command of the Army of the Potomac to 
him while McClellan slowly extricated his army from the mouth of the James River.  
Once again, Union forces were soundly defeated, this time on the same Manassas 
battlefield that had hosted the first meeting of the two armies.   
Northern newspapers, both Democrat and Republican, were at best discouraged 
by the military performance and, more along party lines, sometimes critical of Lincoln 
himself.  The New York Daily Tribune, a Republican paper, remained steadfast in its 
support for Lincoln and the war following the Battle of 2nd Manassas, expressing on 
September 5th a Republican sentiment felt by the president and one he would soon 
exercise.  Concluding a lengthy commentary on the defeat and possible portent of the 
battle, the author stated:  
Whether we can arrive at the necessary result in season to save the country, 
others can judge as well as we. We can only desire and hope. Meantime, 
while we welcome whatever indicates progress, we have faith in nothing 
short of an open, unqualified assertion of the broad principle that the Nation 
recognizes no right in a traitor to her authority to hold a loyal person in 
slavery, but proclaims and will endeavor to vindicate Freedom for All. 46 
The New York Herald, far less sympathetic to the abolitionist cause, also sensed a 
changing of presidential strategy in the face of cumulative defeats. It declared on 
September 5th:  
 





[Following the defeat at Manassas and anticipating a pro-southern partisan 
effort in Maryland to seize railroads north of Washington]… we may aspect 
a concerted demonstration upon the President to revive such exploded and 
discarded schemes as the enlistment of negroes and proclamations by 
abolition generals of emancipation of slaves whom they cannot generally 
reach, nor can they make the thousands of old men and women and children 
that come to our lines other than a clog to army movements and a public 
expense.  
But the Herald was quick to lay the blame for the Army of the Potomac’s defeats 
not on General McClellan, a Democrat, but rather on what they considered his ill-advised 
dismissal:  
It was assumed by the abolition demagogues last winter that the soldiers 
were complaining of General McClellan, but if Fessenden [Whig anti-
slavery US Senator from Maine] and Wilson [Republican anti-slavery U.S. 
Senator from Massachusetts] will now go out among the troops and indulge 
in the calumnies upon that true and tried soldier which wore current in 
Congressional cliques last winter, they will find in short order what are the 
feelings of the Army of the Potomac towards their old commander.  Nor is 
affection to him limited to the veterans. It fully shared by the new regiments, 
who receive him with acclamation on all occasions. The radicals lie low and 
skulk in obscure places just now in view of the restoration of General 
McClellan to command in accordance with the sentiment of the country and 
the army.  47 
The Cleveland Morning Reader on September 5th also mentioned McClellan, but 
less favorably:  
A dispatch speaks of Gen. McClellan as having been appointed to the 
command of the combined armies of Virginia. There has been no official or 
authentic announcement of such an appointment, and for the sake of all the 
brave, fighting men of the army, we trust it is not true. Gen. McClellan has 
too much to answer for to the people of the North already, without adding 
any more months of murderous inaction.48  
The same day, the Chicago Daily Tribune bleakly remarked: 
There has been ample time to gather, drill and arm the whole military force 
of the nation; and after marshalling such an army of armed men as the world 
has never before seen, and making the most gigantic preparations to 
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overthrow the foe, we find him in greater power than ever before; 
reconquering positions and places that he had lost; marching his determined 
forces on cities and States we had thought perfectly safe; and threatening 
Washington with an army, that amid all its reverses, and against the 
determined valor of our best troops, is steadily approaching the capital.49  
Other newspaper queries from the same day further punctuate the most 
fundamental point that all seemed to agree on, regardless of party affiliation – the war 
was not going well for the North.  Even among Republicans, frustration with the current 
course of the war led to demands for change – change in military leadership, change in 
strategy, change regarding slavery.  Democrats, also grimly dissatisfied with the war, 
clamored against what they sensed was coming – slave emancipation. 
During the first southern invasion of the North in September of 1862 but prior to 
the Battle of Antietam, Robert E. Lee wrote to Jefferson Davis on September 8th and 
requested he formally petition the United States government to recognize the 
independence of the Confederate States of America (CSA). Lee’s hope was to better 
position the Confederate government to use the expected Union refusal to entreat foreign 
powers, especially France and Great Britain, to sympathize with the South and grant the 
CSA recognition and aid.  Lee’s motivation to propose a political solution was grounded 
in his awareness of just how numerically and logistically inferior his army was compared 
to the North.  He was also cognizant of the abnormally high number of Confederate 
stragglers after his army crossed the Potomac into Maryland, a point he made in a letter 
to Davis dated September 13th.  Those stragglers were not the result of fatigue – they had 
endured far greater tests of strength and determination in the past.  Rather, their absence 
was a clear expression of the limits to which southerners were willing to go.  The original 
 





argument for war had been resistance to northern aggression, and now they were the ones 
on the offensive.50    
Important to Lee were the upcoming October and November elections in the 
North, and Lee argued that showing the North to be the war-making power would 
influence those elections in the South’s favor.  On September 12th, Jefferson Davis 
responded to Lee’s September 8th letter and included Generals Braxton Bragg and E. 
Kirby Smith in the correspondence.  He directed his generals to issue proclamations to 
the citizens of the northern areas into which they ventured, emphasizing the CSA was 
waging a war of self-defense and that the CSA had sought peace with the North, but had 
received no answer to that request.  The proclamations claimed the CSA asked only that 
the United States cease war and allow the CSA to exist in peace.  With the 1862 elections 
beginning in October, barely a month away, Davis clearly understood Lee’s strategy. So 
did Lincoln.51   
Frustrated by the failed military strategies of his generals, Lincoln recognized the 
nation needed a new focus, one that better addressed the fundamental cause of the war.  
As early as July 13th, 1862, Lincoln proposed the Emancipation Proclamation to Gideon 
Welles and William Seward.  Both agreed a bold measure was needed, but both feared 
the effects of a premature announcement.  Welles noted in his diary: “Mr. Seward said 
the subject involved consequences so vast and momentous that he should wish to give it 
mature reflection before giving a decisive answer, but his present opinion inclined to the 
measure as justifiable, and perhaps he might say expedient and necessary.  These were 
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also my views.”  Welles went on to state, in the same diary entry, noting past refusals by 
Lincoln to consider slave emancipation: “But the reverses before Richmond, and the 
formidable power and dimensions of the insurrection which extended through all the 
Slave States, and had combined most of them into a confederacy to destroy the union 
impelled the administration to adopt extraordinary measures to preserve the National 
existence.”52  Lincoln agreed and refrained from discussing the issue beyond Seward and 
Welles, yet it was clear to the others in his cabinet that his views on slavery were 
changing.  On July 20th, Salmon Chase observed in a letter to his friend Richard Parsons: 
“The slavery question perplexes the President almost as much as ever and yet I think he is 
about to emerge from the obscurities where he has been groping into somewhat clearer 
light.” 53 That light was revealed to the full cabinet on July 22nd.  Lincoln was waiting for 
the right opportunity to make it public. 
  In an open letter to Horace Greeley on August 22nd, in response to an editorial by 
Greely in the New York Tribune on the 19th that questioned Lincoln’s resolve to rid the 
nation of slavery, he responded “…if I could save the union without freeing any slave I 
would do it; and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves I would do it; and if I could 
save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. What I do about 
slavery and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps save the union…”.  Further, 
and of significance, Lincoln continued “I shall try to correct errors when shown to be 
errors, and I shall adopt new views so fast that they shall appear to be true views.” He 
closed with the following:  “I have here stated my purpose according to my view of 
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official duty; and I intend no modification of my oft-expressed personal wish that all men 
everywhere could be free.”54  
 The defeat of Lee at Antietam on September 17th provided Lincoln with the 
victory he needed, and five days later he announced his Emancipation Proclamation to 
Congress and the world.  The New York Herald remarked on the 23rd:  
The gravity of this proclamation will strike everyone. It has been forced 
upon the nation by the abolitionists of the North and the secessionists of the 
South. It inaugurates an overwhelming revolution in the system of labor in 
a vast and important agricultural section of the country which will, if the 
rebels persist in their course, suddenly emancipate three or four millions of 
human beings, and throw them, in the fullness of their helplessness and 
ignorance, upon their own resources and the wisdom of the white race to 
properly regulate and care for them in their new condition of life.55 
The stridently racist tone echoed sentiments shared by many conservative 
Democrats and became more pronounced as the Copperheads emerged as a separate 
political entity in northern politics.  Other newspapers were more concerned with its 
positive portent for slave emancipation and the war effort. The New York Daily Tribune 
rejoiced “God Bless Abraham Lincoln!”56 The Cleveland Morning Leader said much the 
same: “All honor, then, to Abraham Lincoln, the emancipator of three millions of 
slaves.”57  Likewise, the front page of the Chicago Daily Tribune proclaimed: “Let no 
one think to stay the glorious reformation. Every day’s events are hastening its triumph, 
and whosoever shall place himself in its way it will grind him to powder.”58    
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Generally, with significant exceptions, the reaction was positive in the North.  
The split followed party affiliation, and within the Democratic party there was a further 
split between the War Democrats and the conservative Peace Democrats.   The New York 
Express declared: “The whole world will laugh at the impotence of this mere Paper 
Thunder... The President…is in the utterance of this proclamation, doing his best to 
divide the Northern States.”59  
The October and November 1862 elections followed shortly after the public 
announcement of the Proclamation.  John Nicolay and John Hay, both administrative 
aides to Lincoln throughout the war, recorded the effect the Proclamation had on voters: 
The political test of the experiment of military emancipation thus 
announced by the President came almost immediately in the autumn 
elections for State officers and State Legislatures, and especially for 
representatives to the thirty-eighth Congress…The canvas had been 
inaugurated by the Democratic party with violent protests against the 
antislavery legislation of Congress, and it now added the loud outcry that 
the Administration had changed the war for the Union to a war for abolition.  
The party conflict became active and bitter, and the Democrats, having all 
the advantage of an aggressive issue, made great popular gains…The 
number of Democrats in the House of Representatives was increased from 
forty-four to seventy-five, and the reaction threatened for a time to deprive 
Mr. Lincoln of the support of the House.60  
The Democratic gains in the House were substantial, but they only occurred in 
districts that had previously voted for Democrats.  There were some surprising 
Democratic gubernatorial victories (New York and New Jersey) and the delegation from 
Illinois, Lincoln’s home state, went Democratic.  But when the election results from both 
October and November were tallied, although substantial Democratic gains had been 
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made, the House remained under Republican control and in the Senate, the Republicans 
gained five seats.61  
The most notable Democrat to lose in those elections was Clement Valladigham.  
A victim of Republican gerrymandering in Ohio, a defiant Valladigham wasted little time 
in excoriating Lincoln and the Republicans.  He saw the elections of 1862 as 
confirmation of the North’s dissatisfaction with the war and a resounding repudiation of 
Lincoln himself.  On January 14th, 1863 Valladigham signaled a change in Democratic 
rhetoric, one that would define the Copperheads henceforth and further separate them 
from more moderate Democrats and the Republican-allied War Democrats.  He addressed 
Congress and demanded that military coercion cease and that concessions be granted to 
the South to induce reunion. In a long speech entitled The Great Civil War in America, 
Valladigham meticulously outlined his justification for peaceful reunion.  He first 
reminded the House that: “I am one of that number who have opposed 
abolitionism…from the beginning.”   He denounced the usurpation of power by the 
Executive Branch, to include its unilateral declaration of war and move to raise an army 
and navy and to secure funding; all without the consent of Congress.  He decried the 
suppression of civil liberties, the suspension of habeas corpus, the curtailed liberties of 
the press and freedom of speech, violated due process of law – all directly attributed by 
Valladigham to a deliberate and planned violation of the Constitution by the Republicans.  
He reiterated that throughout and prior to war “…to the utmost of my ability and 
 





influence, I exerted myself on behalf of the policy of non-coercion.”  He concluded with 
what was to become the political strategy of the Copperheads and their ultimate undoing:  
But why speak of ways or terms of reunion now?  The will is yet wanting 
in both sections.  Union is consent, and good-will, and fraternal affection.  
War is force, hate, revenge. Is the country tired at last of war? Has the 
experiment been tried long enough? Has sufficient blood been shed, 
treasure expended, and misery inflicted in both the North and the South? 
What then?  Stop fighting.  Make an armistice – no formal treaty.  Withdraw 
your Army from the seceded States.62  
Klement observes Valladigham’s speech ‘shocked’ Lincoln’s supporters.  It 
challenged the prevalent and previously unchallenged Republican view, at least since 
Fort Sumter, that war was the inevitable result of intractable differences over slavery.  It 
energized resistance to the Emancipation Proclamation, officially enacted on January 1st, 
1863, and prompted critics of Lincoln to claim it was unconstitutional and an 
unacceptable alteration to the original justification for war.  Klement further notes that in 
January 1863 ‘partyism erupted with full fury, causing irreparable damage.’63  
On November 24th, 1862, in the aftermath of the fall elections and as the 
Republicans, Democrats and the rest of the Union were still assessing just what those 
results meant, Lincoln wrote a letter to Union General Carl Schurz and responded to that 
general’s claim that Lincoln was responsible for the election results: 
I have just received and read your letter of the 20th.  The purport of it is that 
we lost the late elections and the Administration is failing because the war 
is unsuccessful, and that I must not flatter myself that I am not justly to 
blame for it.  I certainly know that if the war fails, the Administration fails, 
and that I will be blamed for it, whether I deserve it or not.64  
 
62 Valladigham, Speeches, Arguments and Letters of Clement L. Valladigham, 418-453. 
63 Klement, The Copperheads in the Middle West, 40,41. 





Acutely aware of the tenuous hold he and the Republicans maintained in Congress 
and in the broader public, Lincoln’s embrace of emancipation and its thin underpinning 
of military victories made for uncertain political times. 
In his Annual Message to Congress on December 1st, Lincoln addressed the war, 
its effects and the general condition of the nation.  He conspicuously avoided any 
mention of the Emancipation Proclamation, and instead focused on a more gradual and 
compensated emancipation legislative proposal that would eliminate slavery by 1900.  It 
involved both colonization and assimilation, and Lincoln’s focus was more for the latter.  
Lincoln proposed a plan that, if deemed acceptable by the Congress, would become 
‘permanent constitutional law’: 
“It cannot become such without the concurrence of, first two-thirds of Congress and, 
afterwards, three-fourths of the States will necessarily include seven of the slave States. 
Their concurrence, if obtained, will give assurance of their severally adopting 
emancipation at no very distant day upon the new constitutional terms.  This assurance 
would end the struggle now, and save the Union forever.” 65  
Had Lincoln’s proposal been accepted by Congress, it would have required the 
approval of at least three of the seceded states, and the approval of all four slave states 
remaining in the Union.  Regardless, it was clear that Lincoln had moved from the 
ambivalent position on slavery expressed in his open letter to Horace Greeley the 
preceding August and now inextricably associated the war with slave emancipation, 
gradual or immediate.  A clear line had been crossed, the Democrats argued, one that had 
 





previously focused solely on the restoration of the Union.  With the abolition of slavery 
now the stated goal of the North, the Democrats had a clear target for their anger. 
Lincoln closed by saying: “…The fiery trial through which we pass will light us 
down, in honor or dishonor, to the latest generation.  We say we are for the Union.  The 
world will not forget that we say this.  We know how to save the Union.  The world 
knows we do know how to save it…In giving freedom to the slave, we assure freedom to 
the free – honorable alike in what we give and what we preserve. We shall nobly save or 
meanly lose the last, best hope of earth.”66   
 Lincoln was navigating a political course that was deeply dependent on military 
success.  The preliminary Emancipation Proclamation had required military victory to 
achieve political legitimacy, and Antietam had done that – barely.  The same could be 
said for its enactment on January 1st, but instead of victory came a crushing defeat.  On 
12 December 1862 General Ambrose Burnside led the Army of the Potomac to disaster at 
Fredericksburg, suffering over 12,000 casualties and culminating in another Union retreat 
towards Washington.   
 On March 31st, Gideon Welles summarized the gloom felt in Republican 
Washington, as he contemplated the nation’s contentious relationship with England: 
Only by a firm, resolute and defiant tone can the country be rescued, and I 
am by no means certain that will be sufficient.  We are in no condition for 
a foreign war.  Torn by dissensions, an exhausting civil war on our hands, 
we have a gloomy prospect but righteous cause that must ultimately 
succeed.  God alone knows through what trials, darkness and suffering we 
are about to pass.67   
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The Peace Democrats, now largely embraced the Copperhead label and rallied 
behind Valladigham.  Doris Kearns Goodwin’s animates the Congressional atmosphere 
and tone in 1863 in Team of Rivals:   
As the March 4th date of adjournment neared, they [the Copperheads] 
engaged in a variety of tactics to suppress votes on all of these [conscription 
bill, banking reform, slave emancipation] key measures.  They hid out in 
the House lobbies and cloakrooms during quorum calls, attached 
unacceptable amendments onto each of the bills, and kept the Senate up day 
and night with filibusters.68  
 
Weber writes somewhat disparagingly of the Copperheads during this period.  
Whereas they were adamant that the war should be stopped, they offered no proposals for 
just how to do that.  They continued to decry the Emancipation Proclamation and would 
not acknowledge its potential benefit to the North.  When pressed on what peace with the 
South would look like, the best the Copperheads could propose was the failed Crittenden 
Compromise, a desperate measure in late 1860 and especially unpalatable in 1863.69    
Validating Weber’s point, in the spring of 1863 Valladigham and his cohorts were 
active in expressing their disdain for the war and for the Republicans.  Using newspapers 
aligned with the party, the Copperheads promulgated their anti-war messaging.  Typical 
of the virulence of tone common to papers aligned with the Copperheads, the Dayton 
Daily Empire on May 4th, 1863 published the following summation of the Copperhead 
grievances: 
What the War is Carried on For 
For the furtherance of abolitionist designs; the permanent disruption of the 
Union and the perpetuation of sectional hatred between the North and the 
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South. For the special benefit of the shoddy aristocracy, army and navy 
contractors and all that class that was fat and wealthy as the country grows 
poor and that count their gains by the prolonging of the war. 
For the establishment of a national debt equal to, if not greater, than that of 
England, and on which the people will have to pay a much heavier rate of 
interest….  
For the particular advantage of the New England States, whose 
manufacturing profits multiply while the agricultural profits of the West 
diminish.  
For the overthrow of state sovereignty and for the consolidation and 
conversion of its public into a military empire. 
For the constitutional abrogation of rights and privileges, and for the final 
overthrow of liberty on the New World. 
For the criminal purpose of emancipating over three million slaves and 
placing them in a social condition which experience has shown must lead 
to the eventual extinction of the colored population in some localities, and 
their reduction to a state of vagrancy in others.70   
 
The article continued with additional complaints, but those appearing above best 
illustrate how Copperheads were politically aligned.  It is interesting that the next day, 
May 5th, the Dayton Daily Empire published a scathing rebuke of General Burnside 
following the arrest of Clement Valladigham.  The paper closed afterwards and did not 
resume publishing until August 21st. 
It was the Copperheads’ success in gaining a national audience that harmed them 
most.  The rank and file of the Union army felt increasingly alienated by their rhetoric, 
and although it was clear there was widespread disapproval for the Emancipation 
Proclamation within the ranks, it nevertheless was associated by soldiers with the war 
 





effort.  The Copperheads failed to sense the general resolve within the military, with 
exceptions, to continue the fight. 
In their combined recollective works Abraham Lincoln: A History, Nicolay and 
Hay best captured the general mood within the army: 
There were, it is true, hundreds of thousands of Democratic soldiers in the 
ranks fighting to uphold the Union;  and as a result of this – because men’s 
sentiments are far more influenced by their actions than their actions are 
inspired by their sentiments – they were generally induced to take the 
Republican view of public affairs, and by degrees to unite themselves with 
the Republican party. 
Nicolay and Hays went on to note: “But they seemed to exert no influence 
whatever upon their family and relations at home. The Democratic party remained as 
solid in its organization, as powerful in its resistance to the government, as ever.”71  
Vallandigham left the House of Representatives on the 3rd of March 1863 and 
traveled north to New York City where he gave a speech on March 7th.  Speaking without 
script (he later transcribed the speech from newspaper articles and rally notetakers), he 
addressed an audience of like-minded Democrats (the Democratic Union Association) 
and outlined what he believed was the appropriate prescription for resistance to the 
Lincoln administration.  In his opening, he declared: “The conspiracy of those in power is 
not so much for a vigorous prosecution of the war against rebels in the South as against 
the Democrat in peace at home.”  He denounced the suspension of the writ of habeas 
corpus by the Lincoln administration and declared it was the duty of Congress and 
Congress alone to determine when and where such measures were warranted.  He then 
emphasized to a cheering crowd that when fundamental liberties are removed “free 
 





assemblages, free speech, free ballot, and free elections – THEN THE HOUR WILL 
HAVE ARRIVED WHEN IT WILL BE THE DUTY OF FREEMEN TO FIND SOME 
OTHER AND EFFICIENT MODE OF DEFENDING THEIR LIBERTIES [Valladigham 
ensured the preceding was all capitalized].”  He stated later in the speech, having noted 
the critical agency of the military in enforcing military edicts within select northern 
states, especially in midwestern states where Democrats were the most active:  “We have 
our mission here; our business is to fight Abolition rebels in our midst.”  He defiantly 
claimed, of the military; “They are under military law; the command of the President of 
the United States; of their superiors; we are not.  We are the masters of these officials.”  
He reiterated the war was now about slavery, and that restoration of the Union, not 
slavery, had been the original justification for war.  He closed by saying “Instead of 
arresting traitors who are within the limits of the Confederate States, he [Lincoln] 
proposes to arrest men in the North and West, whose only crime is that they choose, in 
the exercise of their rights as freemen, to condemn his policy;…”72  
Thus began a series of speeches whose core design was to challenge what 
Democrats viewed as the imposition of martial law in the North. The reaction in the 
Democratic press was enthusiastic.  On March 9th, The Dayton Daily Empire filled its 
second page with glowing praise for Valladigham’s January address to Congress, as well 
as the one in New York City, and included similar praise from other like-minded 
newspapers (it should be noted that Valladigham had been the editor of the Daily Empire 
from 1847-1849).73  Following his speech in New York City, Valladigham travelled west 
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to Ohio, where on March 13th he addressed a gathering of Democrats in Dayton.74  
Transcripts from that speech are not available,  but the Daily Empire gushed with praise 
for Valladigham the following day.  
Mr. Valladigham descended from the steps, where he had spoken, entered 
his carriage and was escorted by the crowd to his residence… No man in 
this country has been more infamously abused and denounced by the 
Abolitionist leaders, their party press, minions and tools, than Mr. 
Valladigham.  But he has passed through the furnace of persecution 
unscathed, with not even the smell of fire upon his garments. He stands forth 
today the acknowledged able and fearless champion of the Constitutional 
rights of a free people.75  
Others were less enthusiastic.  The Tifton Weekly Tribune, also an Ohio paper but 
one that endorsed the Union Party, published a lengthy attack on Valladigham’s New 
York City speech. 
…But, nevertheless, his theory was “stop the war”, and there would be 
parties in the South, and so on.  Manifestly, this man’s senses have taken 
leave of him.  At the conclusion of his speech, the President of the 
Association called for three “ cheers "for the next Governor of Ohio!”…he 
holds few virtues beyond those essential for digesting victuals; envious, 
cowardly, vain, a splenetic, hungry soul - what heroism word or thought or 
action will you ever get from the like of him?76  
The Tifton Weekly on page 2 continued with an attack on the Copperheads: 
 
With Union on their lips, but treason in their hearts, they are ready to betray 
the North to the South whenever they attain sufficient political power to 
enable them to make the dishonorable transfer with safety to their necks. As 
long at the Union Party holds the reins of government, they know it is 
impossible to execute their treasonable designs. In a contest with such men, 
the members of the Union Party must not occupy equivocal ground. Though 
thousands of their number are on the battlefield, and many are numbered 
with the honored brave who have fallen in defense of the old flag of liberty, 
yet are they capable of defeating the insidious abettors of rebels at home…   
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The article went on to urge its readers: “…There is no time to spare in organizing for the 
Spring elections.  Get together, friends, and consult and prepare your plans, and see that 
your arrangements are complete, leaving no room for failure.77   
 It was clear in the North that the Copperheads had become the central anti-war 
figures, and that either they were to be admired and extolled as staunch Constitutionalists 
and Unionists, as evidenced by their routine coverage in the Chicago Times and the 
Dayton Daily Empire, or lampooned at best and labeled traitorous at worst in the 
Republican press.   
Valladigham was determined to test the Lincoln administration’s authority.  He 
continued to give speeches that were given widespread press coverage, regardless of the 
newspaper’s party affiliation.  On the 21st of March, he spoke in Hamilton, Ohio and 
challenged General Order 15, issued by Headquarters, United States Forces, Indianapolis, 
Indiana on March 17th.  The order addressed what that command considered to be the 
dangerous proliferation of weapons in the military district. It directed all sales of arms, 
powder, lead and percussion caps be prohibited until further notice.  In his speech, 
Valladigham urged the civil courts to challenge the imposition of military rule and orders 
yet continued to promote peaceful dissent within the civil law.  He emphasized the most 
effective protests would be at the ballot box.78  
 On the 25th of March 1863, General Ambrose Burnside took command of the 
Department of the Ohio.  According to Nicolay and Hay “He found his department 
infested with a peculiarly bitter opposition to the war, amounting, in his opinion, to 
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positive aid and comfort to the enemy; and he determined to use all the powers confided 
to him to put an end to these manifestations, which he considered treasonable…He 
issued, on the 13th of April, an order, which obtained wide celebrity under the name of 
General Order Number 38…” The order stated that “all persons found within our lines, 
who commit acts for the benefit of the enemies of our country, will be tried as spies or 
traitors, and, if convicted, will suffer death.”79  
  It is important to note Burnside acted unilaterally – Lincoln had no knowledge of 
it, and one officer on his staff recognized the recklessness of the order and predicted it 
would have a disastrous outcome.80  Valladigham clearly saw it as “a most inspiring text 
for assailing the government” and used it as his central theme in Democratic rallies in 
Ohio.81   An army officer dressed in civilian clothes attended one such rally in Mount 
Vernon, Ohio on May 1st.  He recorded what he heard and returned to his headquarters 
with his report.  Valladigham returned to his home in Dayton following the Mount 
Vernon speech.  On the 4th of May, after dark, a detachment of soldiers from Cincinnati 
arrived by train and arrested him. 
 The opening months of the war saw the parallel rise of the Copperheads and their 
emerging voice and national personification, Clement Valladigham.  No other 
Democratic leader, following the death of Stephen Douglas in 1861, exerted as much 
political clout.  As the virulence of Democratic resistance to the Republicans and Lincoln 
increased, it increasingly found its best expression and national appeal in Valladigham. 
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 To best contextualize the Democrats and their political metamorphosis, it is 
critical to recognize the exceptional circumstances Lincoln faced.  No other president had 
been similarly challenged.  New England dissatisfaction with James Madison and the 
War of 1812, culminating with the Hartford Convention in 1815 was purely rhetorical, 
and any support for secession quickly dissipated with the news of General Andrew 
Jackson’s victory over the British at New Orleans.  The time between 1815 and 1860 was 
certainly not peaceful within the Congress and in the broader public domain, but all 
disturbances had found some level of resolution within the framework of the Constitution 
and civil law.   
The Civil War had no precedent.  Lincoln had been elected to curtail the 
expansion of slavery, resulting in seven slave states voluntarily revoking their allegiance 
to the Constitution and the union.  Four others were poised to do the same.  Lincoln’s 
determination to save the Union rested on untried, uncertain or unknown legal 
fundament.  Yet Lincoln was determined to use the very uncertain authorities of the 
executive branch prescribed by the Constitution to restore the rebellious states. 
From Lincoln’s broad and often contested interpretation of the Constitution a vast 
array of legal challenges gaps arose.  Within what legal framework were the rebellious 
states to be treated?  How were presidential wartime powers, designed for foreign wars, 
to be applied to a purely domestic conflict?  Apart from the debate over the fundamental 
right or lack thereof for states to secede, how were debate and dissension to be treated 
within the remaining union?  Where lay the threshold for treason, and where was the line 
to be drawn between free speech and seditious speech, between loyalty and disloyalty, 





navigated a legally uncertain path and made decisions whose legality and, sometimes, 
advisability, were questioned then and are still questioned and debated by scholars.  
It was against such broad interpretations of executive authority and power that the 
Copperheads railed.  Operating within a much stricter interpretation of the Constitution 
than Lincoln, the Democrats and later the Copperheads were, from a pre-war legal 
perspective, justified in protesting the curtailment of civil liberties, the imposition of 
military authority on citizens not in rebellion, the incarceration of political dissidents 
without due process and more.  Active resistance to the Republicans and the president 
remained peaceful through 1863, and Democrats continued to advocate political change 
through voting. 
Chapter Two will measure when, how, why and to what degree that advocacy 
changed.  Valladigham’s arrest and later exile to the South produced both political 
challenges and opportunities for the Copperheads.  What he did while in the South, 
especially with whom he spoke and what was said, became the stuff of acute interest to 
northerners and southerners alike, and ultimately led to Republican allegations that 
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Chapter Two   
The Arrest of Valladigham, Trial, Exile and Escape from the South 
According to his brother, James Valladigham, writing in 1872, Valladigham had 
expected arrest on many occasions, dating back to a speech he gave in Newark, New 
Jersey on the 14th of February.  In the past, when trouble had been expected, he had 
armed himself and positioned his followers, also armed, both in and outside of his house.   
He made no such preparations the night of May 4th, perhaps because there had been so 
many false alarms. 
The account of the arrest by John Nicolay and John Hay in their combined work 
Abraham Lincoln: A History is surprisingly free of obvious bias, a somewhat remarkable 
achievement given the amount of public criticism it caused the president.  They recount 





company from the 115th Ohio to arrest Valladigham.  That night, the company 
approached the Valladigham house and their commander, a Captain Hutton, demanded 
Valladigham’s surrender. Speaking through his second-floor bedroom window, 
Valladigham loudly refused and fired his pistol several times into the night to warn his 
nearby supporters.  The soldiers promptly burst into the home and arrested Valladigham, 
compelled him to ‘dress with haste’ and hurried him to the special train in which they had 
travelled earlier that evening to Dayton, departing before a crowd could gather.  
Valladigham was taken to Cincinnati and placed in military custody while he awaited 
trial.1  
 In his 1872 biography of his brother, James Valladigham insists the reason 
Clement Valladigham attended the rally at Mount Vernon was to quiet, rather than incite 
the crowd.  James Vallandigham states “..that while he exhorted the people to stand firm 
in defense of their rights, he at the same time counseled them to be patient and 
forbearing, waiting for the ‘sober second thought’ and looking to the ballot box for a 
redress of their grievances.”  He further notes the presence of so many other speakers, 
and that the crowd was large – 15,000 to 20,000, according to the Columbus Crisis – and 
that it was redolent with patriotic fervor while multiple bands played popular Union 
tunes.  He believed Clement Valladigham was clearly the predesignated target, given that 
other speakers were less guarded and more vitriolic, yet only Valladigham was arrested.2    
 His account of the arrest largely fits the Nicolay and Hay version, but with far 
more drama.  Both doors to the house were “attacked”; the back door was breached when 
 
1 John Nicolay and John Hay, Abraham Lincoln: A History, Volume 7, (The Century, 1889), 331,332 





the front door proved too stout for the soldiers to batter down.  Preceding the assault, 
Captain Hutton and Valladigham had spoken, the Captain from the front steps of the 
house and Valladigham from his bedroom’s second-floor window.  Captain Hutton stated 
that if Valladigham refused to surrender (he did refuse) he would be shot.  Once the 
soldiers had forced their way in, Valladigham still evaded capture within the house while 
he waited for relief from his supporters.  Taking time to ‘console the ladies’, he retreated 
until there was no refuge, and only then surrendered.3  
 The next day in Dayton was riotous.  Valladigham’s supporters attacked and 
burned the offices of the Dayton Journal, a Republican newspaper.  The railroad leading 
from Dayton was destroyed and telegraph lines cut.  But James Valladigham notes the 
rioters were poorly organized and armed, and when Union troops arrived that night to 
restore order, they met no resistance.4  
The arrest of Valladigham was significant from multiple national perspectives.  
Many Republican and Democratic newspapers were concerned by what they viewed as a 
troubling military subjugation of civil authority.  The Democratic Dayton Daily Empire 
reacted predictably on the 5th:  “Valladigham Kidnapped!”5  The Ohio paper Ashland 
Union offered a caution beyond its readership: “ We warn the American people, be they 
Democrats or Republicans, to look well to their own interests.  The idea of some that by 
bending the supple knee to power and kissing the foot that tramples them, they will fare 
better than their neighbors will be found to be a delusive hope.”6  Nicolay and Hay wrote: 
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The arrest and sentence of this distinguished Democrat produced a profound 
sensation throughout the country.  It occasioned general rejoicing in the South. 
The government in Richmond saw in it a promise of counter-revolution in the 
North, and some of the Confederate generals built upon it the rosiest hopes for 
future campaigns…The feeling in the North, if less exuberant in it’s expression, 
was equally serious.  No act of the government has been so strongly criticized, 
and none having relation to the rights of an individual created a feeling so deep 
and so widespread.7  
Not everyone condemned the arrest and subsequent military trial.  The Daily Ohio 
Statesman, a Democratic newspaper in Columbus, offered trial coverage using, and 
citing, articles from other  newspapers in its May 19th through 23rd editions and 
published editorials from other papers condemning the Valladigham proceedings, but was 
itself muted on the issue.8  The New York Daily Tribune, Horace Greeley’s staunchly 
Abolitionist newspaper, covered the arrest matter-of-factly, acknowledging the arrest, riot 
and restoration of peace in Dayton in its 6-9 May editions.  The May 19th edition blandly 
noted his sentencing by court-martial; incarceration for the duration of the war. The May 
23rd edition was two sentences long and mentioned extradition to the South.9  Absent was 
any editorial comment.  
Other northern papers were less restrained.  The Maine Oxford Democrat on May 
22nd applauded his sentencing and thought hanging would be a just punishment.10  
Likewise, on the 23rd, the Portland Daily Press said nothing favorable about 
Valladigham.11 The Cleveland Morning Leader also had no sympathy for Valladigham 
and published a scathing rebuke of the Copperheads:  
To cover up their blatant treason, in which they give that aid and comfort to the 
enemy which a corrupt and treasonable heart always gives when its possessor is 
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too cowardly to pick up arms and dare the hazard of battle, the copperhead organs 
and copperhead orators, from Vallandigham, Cox and Vorhees, down to the 
lowest and vilest of the crew who wear butternut breastpins, quote the above 
[Constitution] as a text and rely upon it for impunity in their ravings against the 
Government. They cannot distinguish between free speech and slander -  between 
a free Press and a licentious or a treasonable one.12  
 
Within the administration, reaction to the arrest was generally one of 
apprehension and regret.  Doris Kearns Goodwin wrote in Team of Rivals that “in a 
moment of rare accord, every member of the cabinet united in opposition to the 
Valladigham arrest.”13 Gideon Welles wrote the following in his diary on the 3rd of June: 
The arrest of Valladigham and the order to suppress the circulation of the Chicago 
Times in his military district, issued by Genl Burnside, have created much feeling.  
It should not be otherwise.  The proceedings were arbitrary, and I apprehend 
injudicious.  It gives bad men the right of the question – an advantage of which 
they will avail themselves.  Good men, who wish to support the administration, 
find it difficult to defend these acts.14   
 
Lincoln was in an unenviable position.  He did not and would not have advocated 
the arrest of Valladigham, but neither did he disapprove once it had occurred.  
Valladigham in Congress had been a perpetual critic of the administration and the war, 
and now that he was unencumbered by political office, his rhetoric had become a 
growing threat to support for the war, especially in the West.  But more injurious to the 
administration was the trial.  Hastily convened on May 6th, the day following his arrest 
and staffed only by military officers, testimony was brief and a verdict of guilty delivered 
after three hours of deliberation.  Protesting the legality of a civilian having been tried by 
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a military court, Valladigham requested a writ of habeas corpus.  On the 9th of May, 
Judge Humphrey H. Leavitt, the presiding judge of the Circuit Court of the United States 
for the Southern District of Ohio, convened court and arguments from both parties were 
presented.   
 By far, the greatest source of trial information is from Valladigham himself.  In 
his book, The Trial (or by complete title, The Trial of the Honorable Clement L. 
Valladigham by a Military Commission; and the Proceedings Under His Application for 
a Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern 
District of Ohio),  Valladigham includes the trial transcripts from the military 
commission, as well as all exhibits and submissions to Judge Leavitt.  Valladigham’s 
penchant for the dramatic is confined to his official submissions to the court and are 
juxtaposed with the various statements from others, to include Burnside, to the same 
proceedings.   Valladigham was determined to document what he believed was evidence 
of illegality and Constitutional usurpation by the military, and in doing so compiled an 
extraordinarily complete account that others have used extensively in their later accounts 
of the trial, to include Nicolay and Hay and more recent Copperhead scholars.  
Judge Leavitt was cautious in his findings, ruling on behalf of the Lincoln 
administration and upholding the exercise of emergency powers by the President through 
his appointed representatives, in this case General Burnside.  Judge Leavitt determined 
the requirements and scope of the national crisis justified extraordinary measures by the 
President.  He believed the limits of those powers would and should be determined by the 
Congress and that presidential abuse of those powers, if so believed by Congress, could 





court was whether the arrest was legal and ruled the legitimacy of a military commission 
and its verdict was beyond the purview of the court. Judge Leavitt wrote: 
The sole question is whether the arrest was legal; and as before remarked, its 
legality depends on the necessity which existed for making it; and of that 
necessity, for the reason stated, this court cannot judicially determine.  …under 
our Constitution, which studiously seeks to keep the executive, legislative and 
judicial departments of the government from all interference and conflict with 
each other, it would be an unwarrantable exercise of judicial power to decide that 
a co-ordinate branch of the government, acting under its high responsibilities, had 
violated the Constitution, in its letter or its spirit, by authorizing the arrest in 
question.15  
  
The trial and subsequent civil hearing were widely reported and followed in the 
North and South.  In the North, political support for Valladigham was strictly limited to 
his followers, but a growing concern outside of the Democratic Party for what was 
widely viewed as an abuse of Constitutional liberties temporarily quieted his critics.  
Valladigham’s legal plight generated widespread debate focused on the constitutional 
boundaries separating free and seditious speech and where those constitutional 
boundaries had moved, in the North, in 1863.  Arrests for seditious or politically 
inflammatory speech did not begin with Valladigham – arrests throughout the North, 
especially in the volatile border states, had been routine since the war’s beginning.  But 
Valladigham’s arrest pushed the issue into the national spotlight.  Nicolay and Hay wrote 
in Abraham Lincoln: A History;  “…the orators and politicians of the Democratic party 
regarding the incident as the most valuable bit of political capital which had fallen to 
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them during the year.  Even some of the most loyal newspapers of the North joined in the 
general attack, saying that, by the statutes, Valladigham was a prisoner of state…”.16   
Joel Silbey, in A Respectable Minority, notes the arrest allowed Democrats to use 
Valladigham to personify the suspension of habeas corpus, the establishment of military 
control in the North, the arrest of dissenters and the imposition of loyalty oaths to 
legitimize their accusations that Republicans were disregarding the Constitution and 
threatening traditional democratic institutions.   Silbey quotes Sanford Church, a leading 
New York Democrat who wrote in September of 1863; “I charge the radical and abolition 
leaders of the Republican party with the deliberate design to adopt and carry out a series 
of measures, the effect and object of which is to subvert the union, and not to restore it, to 
overthrow the Constitution and not to preserve it.”17  
 Frank Klement in The Copperheads in the Middle West observes the period from 
April through July was especially bleak for Lincoln.  State elections had been held in 
April 1863 in Illinois, Minnesota, Michigan, Iowa, Kentucky and Ohio and the results 
had been favorable to the Democrats.  Battlefield results had either been outright 
disastrous (Chancellorsville) or had been mired in the apparent stalemate of siege 
(Vicksburg and in Tennessee, where General Rosecrans and his Confederate opponent, 
General Bragg, were both content to wait for the other to move).  The Enrollment Act of 
March 1863 had also produced widespread and growing resentment both in the East, 
where the better known draft riots in New York City resulted in deaths and property 
destruction, and in the West, where the so-called Battle of Fort Fizzle in June revealed 
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dissatisfaction with the draft as well.18 General Burnside’s General Order Number 38 and 
the arrest of Valladigham had only served as a culmination of sorts and had emboldened 
and strengthened the Copperheads.19  
In the South, the Valladigham story received mixed reviews – some newspapers 
were sympathetic to Valladigham, others were uninterested and some antagonistic to both 
Valladigham and Lincoln.  Valladigham and the Peace Democrats/Copperheads were 
often regarded with suspicion and disdain in the South, particularly in Virginia, largely 
because the Copperheads advocated the restoration of the Union.  By 1863, most 
southerners did not share that goal.  The war had been too costly, too bitter for them to 
want anything less than complete independence.  Because of that irreconcilable divide, 
many southerners felt the Copperheads were as hostile to their quest for independence as 
Lincoln’s Republicans.20  But not all.   
The Hillsborough Recorder in North Carolina excoriated Lincoln for his 
‘despotism’ and extolled Valladigham as the North’s version of Great Britain’s Lord 
Chatham.   
The sudden imprisonment and probable sentence of death on Mr. 
Valladigham for simply condemning the policy of his government, show 
how much these phrases and apologies are worth… If sympathy for an 
individual and enemy were permitted, sorrow for the fate of Valladigham 
would be felt by most men of heart in the South.21  
 
 
18 The Ohio History Central Online Encyclopedia, The Battle of Fort Fizzle. Note:  ‘The Battle of Fort 
Fizzle’ was a skirmish fought between Union troops and local draft resisters in the town of Glenmont in 
Holmes County, Ohio on June 17th, 1863. (Author, place and date of publication not indicated). 
19 Frank L. Klement, The Copperheads in the Middle West, (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 
1960), 96-106 
20 Jennifer Weber, Copperheads:  The Rise and Fall of Lincoln’s Opponents in the North, (New York, 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 99 





 The Raleigh Weekly Standard was more muted, publishing without editorial on 
May 20th the charges against Valladigham and Valladigham’s rebuttal to those charges.  
On the 27th, it published a brief excerpt from the New York Herald that read  
“Vallandigham has been imprisoned in Fort Warren. Mass meetings have been held in 
New York and Indiana, denouncing his arrest and imprisonment and the war measures of 
the administration. The Herald regards these demonstrations as the forerunners of civil 
war in the North.”22  Of primary interest to the Standard was the foment in the North. 
The Richmond Enquirer on May 15th was unsympathetic and offered an 
unfavorable opinion of Valladigham and the trial: 
We have, to the great disgust of many, spoken of this Mr. Valladigham not 
as a friend but as an enemy…What is it to us whether their war be 
constitutional or unconstitutional?... One thing, we suppose, is sufficiently 
plain, from those proceedings and from the nature of the defense offered, 
namely: that there is nothing serious in the North-western demonstrations 
of disaffection, up to the present time. Those North-westerns may dislike 
the war, and even be tired of it - that is the unconstitutional war, not the 
other;  but there, is no thought of peace, except on the terms of reunion ; 
and therefore, there can be no peace at all.23   
 
On the 19th, The Richmond Daily Dispatch published a short article announcing 
Lincoln’s decision to exile Valladigham, rather than incarcerate him, but offered no 
opinion.  The same day, the Enquirer was more than willing to weigh in on the matter:   
But it may be, that Mr. Valladigham is to be merely banished to a foreign 
country; and, that, being allowed a choice of residence, he will select the 
Confederacy. In that case he will come on the footing of a refugee simply; 
and we trust that our Confederacy will never be found wanting in the duties 
of hospitality to exiles; he ought, by all means, to have shelter and the 
protection of the laws.  But his choice of an asylum will be singular.  
Canada, France, England, would be at the present time a more agreeable, 
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and certainly a more economical place of refuge. At all events, if he do[es] 
come here as a refugee, we must remember that in all nations it is one of the 
plain terms on which such persons are received that they do not meddle with 
the politics of the country. These indispensable terms must, in the present 
case particularly, be clearly laid down, and, if need be, sternly enforced.24  
 
 Jennifer Weber in Copperheads notes General Lee was concerned by the general 
hostility to the Copperheads in the South, and saw their cultivation as allies essential to 
the Confederate cause, even going so far as to request President Davis intercede with the 
Richmond newspapers, in particular the Richmond Examiner, to tone down their 
criticism.25    
Following his failed legal bid to have his case heard in civil court, Valladigham 
briefly remained in confinement awaiting transfer to Fort Warren, Massachusetts.  But 
Lincoln was of a different mind.   Recognizing the Valladigham maelstrom would only 
worsen with him in northern confinement, Lincoln implemented what had begun as 
cabinet-wide wish that Burnside had simply banished Valladigham to the South, rather 
than arresting him and causing such an uproar.  Lincoln concurred and changed 
Valladigham’s sentence to exile to the South and ordered General Burnside to send 
Valladigham, under guard, to General Rosecrans’ headquarters in Tennessee.  From there 
he was escorted by a company of cavalry commanded by Rosecrans’ provost marshal, 
Major William N. Wiles (the Richmond Enquirer lists his last name as Miles), and taken 
to Murfreesboro, where at daybreak he was taken to the picket line that separated the two 
armies.26   
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The transfer was probably not as dramatic as Valladigham would have liked.  The 
Union cavalry troop rode under a flag of truce, entered the space separating the forces 
and found a Confederate picket.  Colonel Webb of the 11th Alabama was in command, 
and when made aware of the Union troops intent and the person to be transferred, he said 
he had read his speeches and didn’t like them, but that Valladigham could wait where he 
was until guidance from Webb’s superiors could be had.   The colonel then left.  
Unwilling to wait, Major Wiles took Valladigham to a nearby house within the lines and 
left there him with a Confederate private from the 8th Alabama.  Surrendering himself to 
the private, Valladigham declared: “I am a citizen of Ohio, and of the United States.  I am 
here within your lines by force, and against my will.  I therefore surrender myself to you 
as a prisoner of war.” James Valladigham confirmed the above in his 1872 biography of 
his brother, and further insisted his brother was calm throughout and ‘warmly received’ 
once through the lines.27  
  James Valladigham’s account of his brother’s first week in exile is 
extraordinarily detailed, up to his brother’s departure from Shelbyville, Tennessee on 
June 2nd, 1863.  Richly described is Clement Valladigham’s dinner with General 
Rosecrans the night before his exile as well as the argument between them that began the 
night and its convivial conclusion four hours later.  Meticulously addressed is the 
composition of the cavalry unit that escorted him to the battle lines and the actions that 
followed.  The same applies to his initial reception in the South and the week that 
followed.  But after June 2nd, James Valladigham chose to concentrate on political 
 






developments in the North, particularly the Ohio Democratic Convention, Valladigham’s 
nomination for governor and the Ohio delegation that was subsequently sent to 
Washington to present its findings and complaints to Lincoln.  Lincoln’s rebuttal letter to 
the Democratic Convention in Ohio, sent after he met with its delegates, is also included, 
and criticized, by James Valladigham.  Absent in the book is any description of what took 
place between June 2nd and his brother’s departure from Wilmington, North Carolina on 
June 18th.  What Clement Valladigham did during that two-week span was soon fraught 
with controversy in the North, and in late 1863, and especially 1864, led to accusations 
by Republicans of conspiracy against the United States government and collusion with 
the enemy.  For James Valladigham to ignore that period fuels scholarly curiosity, 
especially given his stated purpose in the book’s preface to memorialize his brother.28  
Throughout his book, it is clear James seeks to exonerate his brother wherever and 
whenever trouble or accusation loomed, yet he is silent about the most mysterious period 
in Clement Valladigham’s political and public life. 
On the 2nd of June, Jefferson Davis wrote General Braxton Bragg, presumably by 
telegraph, and thanked him for his dispatch to the Adjutant General reporting 
Valladigham’s arrival in Shelbyville, Tennessee (sending date of General Bragg’s letter 
unknown, received in Richmond June 1st) and directed him to send “Hon. C. L. 
Valladigham as an enemy alien under guard of an officer to Wilmington where further 
orders await him”.  General Bragg responded to Jefferson Davis: “Upon Mr. 
Valladigham’s earnest request he was permitted to go this morning to Lynchburg to 
confer with a distinguished friend of Virginia [Thomas S. Bocock].  He reports from 
 





there on parole to the War Department.”29 James Valladigham notes his brother had been 
further directed by General Bragg on the 1st of June ‘to report on parole to General 
Whiting at Wilmington, North Carolina.”30   
Clement Valladigham began his journey from Shelbyville on the morning of June 
2nd.  The pace at which he travelled, the exact route taken and how or if he 
communicated, is vague if known at all.  By modern road, the most direct route from 
Shelbyville, Tennessee to Lynchburg, Virginia is 521 miles.  The rail route on which 
Valladigham travelled began, for him, in Murfreesboro and ran south to Chattanooga, a 
major rail hub.  From there he probably would have travelled to Knoxville and then to 
Lynchburg.  That route would have been the most direct and close to 600 miles long. 
It is important to understand the timing of Valladigham’s journey. It is unlikely he 
travelled more than 10 hours a day, and at an average southern train speed of 10 miles-
per-hour, his journey to Lynchburg would have taken 6 days, arriving on the evening of 
June 8th. 31   On that day, Jefferson Davis wrote General Bragg:   
 
29 Jefferson Davis, The Papers of Jefferson Davis, Volume 9, edited by Lynda Lasswell Crist, Mary Seaton 
Dix, and Kenneth H. Williams, (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1997), 204 
30 James Valladigham, A Life of Clement L. Valladigham, 301. Note: It is probable James Valladigham 
pieced many of his facts together in 1871 following his brother Clement’s death, so it is likely his 
observation was based on notes his brother had made.  
31 Robert C. Black, Railroads in the Confederacy, Civil War History, Volume 7, Number 3, Sep 1961, 
(Kent, Kent State University Press, 1961), 231-238. Note: Trains in the South in 1863 travelled at an 
average speed of 10-15 miles-per-hour, due to poor track and engine maintenance and the state of train 
technology.  The rail system was poorly maintained, locally managed and often disconnected from other 
lines, requiring trains to disembark passengers and cargo for transfer to a separate rail system, often on the 
other side of a southern town or city.  Many of the rail lines had been constructed and run by northerners 
before the war, and their departure as hostilities began drained the South of critically needed expertise.  
Train engines were few, parts scarce and there were few technicians who could repair them.  Most engines 
had been manufactured in the North.  There were few rail lines longer than 100 miles – most lines had 
existed to transport cotton and other agricultural products from plantations to markets and ports and had no 
connection to a broader rail network.  Rail gauges varied by state and by rail line, and often isolated lines 
had engines and rail cars that could not be moved from those lines for use elsewhere.  Trains seldom moved 





Your letter of the 3d received this morning.  My dispatch in relation to the 
Hon. Mr. Valladigham indicated a course but little different from that which 
in the absence of instructions you had adopted.  In furtherance of our 
purpose Mr. Ould Commissioner for the exchange of prisoners of war, has 
been sent to Lynchburg to meet Mr. Valladigham and to conduct him to 
Wilmington, whence his departure for a neutral port will be facilitated by 
all the courtesy and kindness due to his condition.32  
 
Robert Ould’s official position in the Confederate government was Commissioner 
of Prisoner Exchange.  He also served as the functional chief of the Confederate Secret 
Service under Judah Benjamin, the Confederacy’s Secretary of State.  It was in both 
capacities he was sent to meet Valladigham, but it was the latter that helped raise later 
suspicions, in the North, of collusion with the enemy. 
 
Concurrent with Valladigham’s movements in the South were Democratic rallies 
in the North.  At meetings in Illinois, Indiana, New Jersey, New York, Ohio and 
elsewhere Democrats continued to protest the Valladigham arrest and trial.  On June 11th, 
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the Democratic Convention in Ohio met in Columbus and nominated Valladigham for 
governor.  In their book Abraham Lincoln: A History, Nicolay and Hays wrote: 
They passed a series of resolutions affirming their devotion to the Union, 
denouncing the arrest and banishment of Valladigham as a forcible violation 
of the Constitution and a direct insult offered to the sovereignty of the 
people of Ohio, saying the Democratic party was fully competent to decide 
whether Mr. Valladigham was a fit man to be nominated for governor, and 
that the attempt to deprive them of that right by his arrest and banishment 
was an unmerited imputation upon their intelligence and loyalty.  They 
therefore called upon the President to restore Mr. Valladigham to his home 
in Ohio.33  
 
Earlier, following Valladigham’s arrest and trial but prior to his exile to the South, 
a like-minded convention of Democrats in Albany, New York met on the 16th of May and 
drafted a series of protest resolutions.  The principle author was a New York politician 
and sitting member of the U.S. House of Representatives, Erastus Corning.  Lincoln, in 
Washington, received them on the 19th and responded on the 12th of June.  In an open 
letter circulated throughout the northern papers, and later the southern papers, Lincoln 
addressed the arrest of Valladigham and the broader issue of wartime executive powers, 
specifically where the exercise of those powers was believed by his critics to be in 
conflict with Constitutional liberties.  Lincoln’s letter offered a legal, moral and logical 
rebuttal of the principle Democratic charge of unlawful abridgement of free speech 
through the systematic suspension of habeas corpus, resulting in arbitrary arrests, 
imprisonment and, in the unique case of Valladigham, exile.34  
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Within the Corning letter Lincoln made many forceful and compelling points, but 
perhaps the most notable, and the one that resonated best with the voting public in the 
North, was the following:  
Long experience has shown that armies cannot be maintained unless 
desertion shall be punished by the severe penalty of death.  The case 
requires, and the law and the Constitution sanction, this punishment.  Must 
I shoot a simple-minded boy who deserts, while I must not touch a hair of a 
wily agitator who induces him to desert? This is none the less injurious 
when effected by getting a father, or brother or friend into a public meeting, 
and there working upon his feelings till he is persuaded to write the soldier 
boy that he is fighting in a bad cause, for a wicked Administration of a 
contemptible Government, too weak to arrest and punish him if he shall 
desert.  I think that in such a case to silence the agitator and save the boy is 
not only constitutional, but, withal, a great mercy.35  
 
Lincoln’s letter to Erastus Corning provided a powerful check to the momentum 
the Democrats had gained in May.  In a bland and understated entry in his diary, Gideon 
Welles noted on June 14th “The letter to Erastus Corning and others is published and 
well-received.”36 Nicolay and Hays wrote of the letter; “ There are few of the President’s 
state papers which produced a stronger impression upon the public mind than this.”  They 
went on to state: 
Its tone of candor and courtesy, which did not conceal his stern and resolute 
purpose; his clear statement of the needs of the country; his terse argument 
of his authority under the Constitution to suspend the writ of habeas corpus 
when, in case of rebellion, the public safety required it; his contrast of the 
venal crime of the simple-minded boy, which was punished by death, with 
the deeper guilt of the wily agitator, who claimed immunity through the 
Constitution he was endeavoring to destroy; the strong, yet humorous, 
common sense of his doubt whether a permanent taste for emetics could be 
contracted during a fit of sickness – met with an immediate and eager 
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appreciation among the citizens of the country, and rendered this letter 
remarkable in the long series of Mr. Lincoln’s political writings.37  
 
Doris Kearns Goodwin wrote in Team of Rivals “…Lincoln took every step to 
ensure his words would shape public opinion.  Printed in a great variety of formats, the 
letter eventually reached an astonishing 10 million people in their homes and workplaces, 
on isolated farms and in the cities.  And as the American people absorbed the logic of 
Lincoln’s argument, popular sentiment began to shift.”38  Jennifer Weber in Copperheads 
views the Erastus Corning letter as ‘an astute political move’, one that highlighted the 
Democrats (Copperheads) refusal to acknowledge the peril the country faced and the 
extraordinary actions war compelled, as well as their refusal to support those efforts.  She 
further notes the period was one of political uncertainty in the North.  Public support for 
the war had been eroded by the 1863 Enrollment Act, challenged by the Valladigham 
affair, further stressed by the Union defeat at Chancellorsville and the apparent military 
stalemate in the West, and the increasing desire to link emancipation to calls for enlisting 
black soldiers into the ranks of the Union army.  All could have provided the fodder for 
Copperhead success at the polls, but rather the reverse was slowly becoming true.  As 
noted in Chapter One, the Union army may have been battered and discouraged in 1863, 
but resolve to fight it out had only deepened, and within the ranks of the army resentment 
for the Copperheads was growing, as was support for the inclusion of black soldiers in 
the fight.39  The draft riots in New York were the most violent reaction to conscription in 
the North, and there were less notable but still violent draft protests elsewhere in the 
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North and West, but once they had run their course, by force or by exhaustion, conscripts 
emerged and reinforced the Union Army.   
Joel Silbey in A Respectable Minority contends the anti-war Democrats were 
doomed from the outset.  Stephen Douglas had warned his colleagues at the beginning of 
the conflict not to confuse opposition to the President and Republicans with support for 
the war effort. Historically, Silbey notes, Douglas knew opposition to war in the United 
States, from the Hartford Convention in 1815 to the Mexican War, had always ended 
badly for the dissenting political party.  Ignoring Douglas’s advice, by 1863, 
Valladigham and the Copperheads had adopted increasingly strident messaging that 
continued to promote the restoration of the Union at all costs, to include peace without 
victory.  The different issues that formed the composite of Democratic opposition to the 
war; unwarranted suspension of habeas corpus, slave emancipation, restrictions on 
commerce caused by war, conscription and all too routine Union military defeat, all 
resonated and gained sympathy with voters as either individual issues or in groupings less 
than the whole.  But the entire platform was too much for most to support.  In both the 
North and the South, resentment for the Copperheads was growing, and as opposition to 
the Copperheads stiffened, the messaging from them not only remained unchanged, but 
became harsher.40  
Silbey attributes the deepening entrenchment of the Copperheads in 1863 to the 
political intransigence and extraordinary influence of Clement Valladigham.  On October 
29th, 1855, Valladigham, then a rising star in the Democratic party, gave a speech entitled 
 





The History of the Abolition Movement to assembled Democrats in Dayton, Ohio 
following their party’s defeat in state-wide elections.  In it he outlined the political 
philosophy he held throughout his political career: 
But no party, gentlemen, is at all times equally pure and true to principle 
and its mission.  And whenever the Democratic party forgets these, it loses 
its cementing and power-bestowing element; it waxes weak, is 
disorganized, is defeated – till, purging itself of its impurities, and falling 
back and rallying within its impregnable entrenchments of original and 
eternal principles, it returns…with irresistible might and majesty…it is this 
recuperative power…which distinguishes the Democratic party from  every 
other; and it owes this wholly to its conservative element, FIXED 
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.41  
 
 The anti-war Democrats, in their later incarnation as Copperheads, stubbornly 
held to their party agenda and instead of bending to a changing voter sentiment, only 
stiffened their platform and resolve.  Frank Klement in The Copperheads in the Middle 
West agrees and notes the price they paid for their intractable resistance to the war was 
steep, especially in late 1863 and 1864.  But in May and June of 1863, Valladigham had 
become a rallying cry for many in the country and had reenergized the Copperheads.42  
 Returning to Valladigham’s journey in the South, there are few remaining 
artifacts for historians to examine and thus better understand, and contextualize, his 
conduct between June 2nd and June 18th.  Valladigham, a prolific writer and eager 
chronicler of himself, says nothing of his journey or meetings in the South.  As noted, his 
brother James omits all details of Valladigham’s travels from June 2nd to June 18th in his 
biography.  Further blurring historical vision, the Confederate Secretary of State, Judah 
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Benjamin, ordered the burning of diplomatic and state records, to include all Confederate 
Secret Service records, following the Confederate government’s evacuation from 
Richmond in April of 1865.  Also frustrating, the Thomas S. Bocock papers at the 
University of Virginia contain no correspondence with, or mention of, Valladigham.  The 
document produced by Robert Ould and reviewed by Jefferson Davis that recorded 
Ould’s conversation with Valladigham was subsequently destroyed, presumably at the 
end of the war.  In short, there are few records of Valladigham’s journey.  But one can 
make  some credible assumptions. 
It is likely that soon after his arrival in the South, Clement Valladigham wrote to 
Mr. Bocock and requested a meeting.  Valladigham, a committed politician who had 
suffered a grievous wrong and had thus been provided a potent opportunity for redress 
and celebrity, would not have remained idle long.  Thomas Bocock had been a colleague 
and ally in the United States House of Representatives during the pre-war era, and 
engagement with him while in the South would have been justifiable from a Copperhead 
perspective and viewed by Valladigham as potentially beneficial to the broader 
Copperhead cause.  Restoration of the Union and preservation of the Constitution had 
been the Democratic mantra from the war’s beginning and learning Thomas Bocock’s 
views on reunification and possibly gaining his support would have been irresistible to 
Valladigham.   
There was enough time for Valladigham to receive a response from Mr. Bocock, 
and it is likely Mr. Bocock’s response was presented to General Bragg when 
Valladigham and Bragg met on June 1st.  The Confederate Postal Service was mostly 





southern telegraph, both poorly maintained and fragmented and neither centrally 
managed.  But the rail line between Murfreesboro and Chattanooga, as well as the line 
that connected Chattanooga to Lynchburg, were both frequently used for military 
transport as well as passenger service and likely both were used for routine postal service.  
It is likely there was adequate time for correspondence between the two men to take place 
between May 26th and June 1st.  It is also possible, given the high visibility of 
Valladigham’s exile, that the telegraph may have been used by Valladigham to 
communicate with Bocock, just as Davis used it to communicate with Bragg.  Regardless 
of method, it is unlikely Valladigham would have been allowed to travel to Virginia by 
General Bragg without Bocock’s consent to a meeting. 
An examination of the Thomas S. Bocock papers revealed no evidence of any 
meeting with Valladigham.  Only one piece of unrelated 1863 correspondence to Bocock 
is on file, and although it contains some miscellaneous 1863 correspondence from 
Bocock, none is relevant to this study.   Entries in Thomas Bocock’s financial ledger 
neither indicate nor refute his presence in Lynchburg during the probable period of 
Valladigham’s stay (June 9th – 14th).   There are two June 9th entries separated by June 
11th  – both record household-related transactions.  The second has a mark at the top that, 
for the conspiracy-minded historian, could be mistaken for a V, but is most likely a 
checkmark of probable unimportance.  In short, nothing in the Bocock archives suggests 
in any way that the two men met.43  
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Known is that Valladigham met with Robert Ould in Lynchburg and that Robert 
Ould had been sent there to meet with him by Jefferson Davis.   Ould constructed a 
synopsis of that conversation and sent it to Jefferson Davis in a package marked 
‘important’.  It arrived in Richmond on or before June 17th.  In his diary, John 
Beauchamp Jones (J.B. Jones), a high-ranking war clerk in the Confederate War 
Department, noted on June 18th:  “I have good reason to suppose that the package 
marked “important,” etc., sent from the President’s office yesterday to the Secretary of 
War, was the substance of a conversation which took place between Mr. Ould and Mr. 
Valladigham.”44  On June 22nd,  J.B. Jones received the document for filing. 
Today I saw the memorandum of Mr. Ould, of the conversation held with 
Mr. Valladigham, for file in the archives.  He says if we _ can only hold out 
_ this year that the peace party of the North would sweep the Lincoln 
dynasty out of political existence.  He seems to have thought that our cause 
was sinking, and feared we would submit, which would, of course, be 
ruinous to his party!  But he advises strongly against any invasion of 
Pennsylvania, for that would unite all parties in the North, and so strengthen 
Lincoln’s hands that he would be able to crush all opposition, and trample 
upon the constitutional rights of the people.”45  
 
In June of 1863, the South was in a tenuous political and military position.  
Southern diplomats were active in England and France, entreating both to actively 
intervene on the South’s behalf.  Vicksburg was besieged and remained the last 
Confederate bastion on the Mississippi River and all that prevented Union domination of 
the West.  The desperation in the West was in sharp contrast to continued military 
success in the East, at least in Virginia.  The Union disaster at Chancellorsville in May 
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had boosted flagging southern morale and helped inspire a plan for winning the war – 
another military incursion into the North, again using Lee’s army.  Such planning was 
seldom a secret – newspapers North and South routinely reported troop movements, troop 
concentrations and opinions on the strategy behind them.  For Valladigham to have 
offered an opinion on what was broadly known is therefore not surprising. But clear in 
2020 as well as in 1863 was the political volatility of advising a foreign and hostile 
government on any strategy intended for use against the official interests of the United 
States.  It is apparent political advantage was foremost in Valladigham’s mind, and any 
act that destabilized the Lincoln administration was acceptable.  Always of professed 
interest to Valladigham was the sanctity of the Constitution, yet Article III, Section 3 of 
the Constitution states:  “Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying 
War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.”   It is 
clear that section of the Constitution was not considered when he spoke with Ould.46    
J.B. Jones continued in his diary: “Mr. V. said nothing to indicate that either he or 
the party had any other idea than that the Union would be reconstructed under 
Democratic rule. The President [Davis] indorsed, with his own pen, on this document, 
that, in regard to invasion of the North, experience proved the contrary of what Mr. V. 
asserted.”  Jones then opined: “But Mr. V. is for restoring the Union, amicably, of course, 
and if it cannot be so done, then possibly he is in favor of recognizing our independence. 
He says any reconstruction which is not voluntary on our part, would soon be followed 
by another separation, and a worse war than the present one.”47  
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Meanwhile, regardless of political allegiance, northern papers remained fascinated 
with Valladigham and the Copperhead platform. Democratic papers kept the perceived 
injustice to Valladigham active in the public sphere.  The Ohio Ashland Union on June 
24th accused states that were predominantly ‘Abolitionist’ (Republican) of contributing 
fewer conscripts than required, forcing the Democratic states (Ohio in this instance) to 
contribute more to make up the deficit.    The paper further railed against a claim made 
by Ohio Abolitionists that they were against the idea of political parties and that 
Democrats should do the same: “They strike down the Constitution for party!  They strike 
down the courts, the writ of habeas corpus, the right of trial by jury, the civil liberty and 
the freedom of the people, all for party!”  The article went on to proclaim the opposite for 
the Democrats, restating the Copperhead political mantra: “   The Democrats care nothing 
for party farther than its influence in sustaining the Constitution, the Union, the liberties, 
and the rights of the people.  Who then are the miserable partisans?”48 In Indiana a 
humorous article appeared in the Daily Sentinel on June 24th, perhaps reflecting a 
growing desire to move beyond the arrest, trial and exile: “It is predicated that Mr. 
Valladigham will return to Canada before the middle of July, from thence proceed to 
New York, and thence to Ohio, and yet stump that state before the election in October. 
The Republicans leaders of Cincinnati have petitioned the President to recall Mr. 
Valladigham to his home, for their political interest, and to shut up the cry about the 
persecution of Mr. V.”49  
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 Republicans kept the Valladigham narrative alive, understanding his political 
vulnerability and sensing a growing public dissatisfaction with the Copperheads.  The 
New York Daily Tribune reacted to Lincoln’s open letter to Erastus Corning on June 16th:  
“We do not perceive that anything could be added, or that any addition is needed, to the 
President's vindication of his Constitutional power to arrest persons who, not venturing 
upon treason overt, are helping Jeff. Davis and his fellow traitors in the loyal States.”50  
The Ohio Tifton Weekly Tribune on June 19th continued that theme, declaring: “ When a 
man or set of men travel from neighbor to neighbor, with peace petitions in their hand for 
signatures, we cannot but conclude that such men have not the best disposition towards 
their country -  that they mean evil. This is no time for peace by compromise with 
traitors: It is a time for powder, lead and bayonets.  And we regard the act disloyal at this 
time to work for peace in any other way or manner than the mode adopted by our 
soldiers.”51 The Ohio Cleveland Morning Leader enthusiastically followed the 
Republican nominating convention for governor, and offered the following conclusion to 
a long article affirming the moral rectitude and political fitness of Mr. Brough, the 
gubernatorial nominee: “He [Mr. Wade of the nominating committee] had never seen a 
convention more harmonious. The nominations were all most fit to be made, and we shall 
come up more than victorious in October next.  He thanked the Democracy that they had 
separated the sheep from the goats (applause ) Vallandigham, cringing for peace on the 
one side, and Honest John Brough on the other. (Immense applause.)”52  
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By the end of June, political foment was returning to its pre-arrest (of 
Valladigham) level.  Lincoln’s exile of Valladigham and subsequent open letters had 
done much to calm civil fears, at least with non-Democrats.  Most political attention was 
now focused on the Fall 1863 elections.  In Ohio, the Republican nomination of John 
Brough for governor pitted a candidate who had once, the Republicans proclaimed, been 
a Democrat against the Democrats.  The Republicans may have sensed the weakening of 
the Copperheads in June-July 1863, but they were not taking chances.  Frank Klement 
states in The Copperheads of the Middle West: “The Republicans did not let the election 
go by default.  They recognized that Valladigham’s election to the governorship of Ohio 
would enhance the cause of peace and weaken the war effort.  He had become a symbol, 
so they turned all their energies and ingenuity toward defeating him.”53  
Following his interview with Robert Ould, Valladigham was either accompanied 
by him to Wilmington, North Carolina or made the journey alone.  One assumes they 
traveled together, with Ould acting in his overt capacity as the Commissioner of Prisoner 
Exchange to ensure quick passage on a blockade runner.  Valladigham departed the night 
of June 17th on the steamer Cornubia, commanded by a Captain Gayle.54  The Richmond 
Daily Dispatch reported on June 20th: “Valladigham has safely run the blockade from 
Wilmington, N.C.  He is going to Bermuda, and thence to Canada.”55 The Staunton 
Spectator offered the following on June 30th: 
Mr. Vallandigham is no longer in the Confederacy. He has sailed from 
Wilmington, and so many days ago that ere this he is either safe on British 
soil or deck, or captured again by his admirers at Washington. Mr. 
Vallandigham, when thrust into our lines, presented himself as prisoner to 
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our authorities, and was so held while in our limits. He requested an exit 
from one of our ports, and it was accorded him. We probably shall soon 
hear of Vallandigham in Canada, and next of his crossing the line in great 
triumph as Governor of Ohio.56  
__________ 
 
 With their party’s political viability, credibility and vitality inextricably tied to 
Valladigham’s legal and popular fate, the Copperheads found themselves in a curious 
place in May and later June of 1863.  Valladigham’s military arrest, trial, incarceration 
and exile had provided fertile grounds for cross-party grumbling.  Many Republican 
voters were also uncomfortable with the growing curtailment of civil liberties in the 
North, and for a brief period opportunity for a common complaint against the government 
existed.  Lincoln certainly understood how legally charged the arrest had been, and that if 
the path set by General Burnside was left alone it would only produce continued political 
misery for his administration. Fortunately for Lincoln, his greatest ally in the 
Valladigham crisis was Valladigham himself. 
Clement Valladigham’s legal predicament not only altered his own political 
trajectory, but also irreparably changed the nation’s perception of him and the 
Copperheads.  At a time when the war’s end was far away, and its winner and loser 
unknowable, Valladigham’s desire for political ascendance was inextricably bound to a 
platform of issues most voters disliked.  Worse, he bound his strategic vision to three 
tenets he clearly did not fully understand.  He underestimated the strength, will and 
political aptitude - and cunning - of Lincoln.  He over-estimated voter support beyond his 
cabal of Copperhead supporters, and clearly confused large gatherings of supporters for 
 





more than what they were.  Perhaps most gravely, he failed to understand the South and 
its’ resolve to go its own way, instead insisting its reunification with the North would be 
a natural and reflexive result of peace.  It was the last that best enabled his northern 
critics to disable him politically, coupling him with a belligerent with whom the nation 
was at war and one that disagreed with him as much as it hated the North. 
The next chapter chronicles his final and most grave miscalculations.  
Valladigham in Canada is a tale of intrigue, hubris and accusations of treason.  
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…Already we see the beginning of the end. The progress of discontent at 
the North, and the growing clamors for peace, will, after a while, paralyze 
the energies of the Administration. Whilst our armies are energetically 
engaged in conquering a peace, we shall find co-workers in the Northern 
men, who, convinced that war will never restore the Union, are determined 
to inaugurate peace. They will have peace, and that secured, if natural 
affinities and argument cannot effect re-construction of the Union, as they 
wish, they will never consent to try again the arbitrament of arms. This we 
understand to be the position of Vallandigham; now the most prominent, 
the most popular, and the ablest statesman of the North. 1 
 
 Valladigham’s voyage from Wilmington was mostly uneventful.  Sometime 
during the passage, a Union warship spotted the blockade runner and moved to intercept 
her.  In his 1872 biography of his brother, James Valladigham claimed the Union ship 
 





was the faster vessel and capture seemed inevitable.  In James’ account, Valladigham the 
passenger asked the captain of the blockade runner if he had any red jackets on board and 
when told yes, advised the captain to have his crew put them on and parade on deck to 
give the appearance of a British crew on a British vessel.  The captain did as advised, the 
Union warship veered away and the blockade runner continued her journey. He also 
wrote:  
A false and ridiculous account of this affair was published by the enemies 
of Mr. Valladigham several years afterwards, in which it was stated that he 
was greatly alarmed on that occasion, and so overjoyed at his escape from 
capture that he shed tears and clasped the hand of the Captain of the vessel 
in warm embrace.  There is not a word of truth in it….As to the story of 
childish joy of at his escape and the ridiculous mode of exhibiting it, no one 
acquainted with his perfect coolness in circumstances the most exciting will 
be so credulous as to believe it.2  
 
Whether cool or not on his voyage, Clement Valladigham was now sailing into a 
turbulent political sea.  In the North, Democrats and Republicans remained as 
ideologically entrenched as before.  His critics, emboldened by his exile, had speculated 
on his conduct while in the South and used every opportunity to attack Valladigham and 
the Copperheads.  His Democratic allies continued to use the disappointing war and his 
arrest, trial and exile to their best advantage, and believed the 1863 fall elections would 
provide them with much-needed victories.  In June of 1863, the Democrats believed the 
political winds were favorable to them, yet three major events in July would, in quick 
succession, dampen their optimism.  Within weeks following Valladigham’s departure 
from Wilmington, the battle of Gettysburg in the East and the fall of Vicksburg in the 
 





West provided the Union with much-needed victories.  Shortly following those victories, 
anti-war sentiment, fueled in part by the Valladigham affair and stoked by New York 
Democrats, erupted in the New York City draft riots.  
Jennifer Weber in Copperheads attributes much of the blame for the draft riots to 
the Governor of New York, Democrat Horatio Seymour.  New York Democrats, still 
angered by the Emancipation Proclamation, saw an opportunity to exploit Irish fears of 
economic marginalization.  Using the issue of race to incite mob violence, the Democrats 
believed they could grow Irish support for the Democratic Party by convincing them an 
ever-increasing black population threatened Irish jobs.  Democrat-led resistance to the 
Enrollment Act and its planned implementation in July married well to the growing 
Irish/black discord.  On the 4th of July in New York City,  Governor Seymour addressed a 
Democratic rally.  He railed against the Lincoln administration’s military failures and its 
all-too-customary call for additional men.  He told his audience he was exhausted with 
Republican oppression, particularly the suppression of peaceful dissent, and that ‘action 
on the part of the people was sometimes justifiable.’ He closed with a perfunctory 
exhortation for his audience to offer protest within the framework of the law and the 
Constitution, but that message clearly went unheeded.3  
The riots were contagious.  Weber notes unrest spread across the North, and 
similar disturbances, all linked to the Enrollment Act but smaller in scope and violence, 
erupted in the East in Boston (Massachusetts) , Portsmouth (New Hampshire),  Rutland 
(Vermont) and Troy (New York) and in the West in Wooster, Ohio.  Alarmed by the 
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widespread violence, many northerners feared a further fragmentation of the Union.  
Potentially making matters worse was a Confederate cavalry raid in the Midwest, led by 
John Hunt Morgan.4  
The reverse proved to be true.  Frank Klement in The Copperheads in the Middle 
West observes it was Confederate General Beauregard who ordered the raid.  He had 
been inspired by the Valladigham arrest and was convinced the North, and especially the 
Northwest, was ready to rise against the Lincoln administration.  In early July 1863, 
Morgan’s raiders moved into Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio, hoping to recruit Copperheads 
to the Confederate cause.  Instead, ‘several’ of Morgan’s raiders later observed that the 
Copperheads and Valladighamers’ fought as hard or harder against them than other 
northerners, and that the Copperheads, the very people they believed were sympathetic to 
the Confederacy, regarded the raiders as ‘horse thieves’, ‘extortionists’ and 
‘blackmailers’.5   
As the riots subsided, and the raid ended with Morgan’s capture and confinement 
at the end of July, Copperhead insistence on linking resistance to the war with resistance 
to Lincoln began to backfire.  The Union triumphs at Gettysburg and Vicksburg had 
electrified the North.  In the East, General Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia had been 
repulsed and severely weakened.  In the West, General Pemberton’s Confederate army 
had surrendered to General Grant and the Confederacy had been cut in two.   Both 
victories strengthened the Republican argument for war and renewed northern resolve to 
see the conflict out.  Copperhead culpability in the draft riots further sharpened the divide 
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between the parties, and support for the Peace Democrats wavered within the Democratic 
party itself.   
Two ideological factions, the Purists and the Legitimists, began to emerge. The 
Purists remained ideologically unchanged and were aligned with Valladigham, opposing 
both the Lincoln administration and the war. The Legitimists were a deviation from the 
traditional Peace Democratic platform and were aligned with Samuel Cox.  They focused 
on resistance to Lincoln and the Republicans and believed removing the Republicans was 
their most important task.  They were not War Democrats, and they had not abandoned 
their objections to the war.  Rather, they believed the issues of war and peace could be 
only be successfully addressed when a Democratic majority was achieved in 
Washington.6  
Cox was a committed Copperhead.  Long allied with Valladigham and fellow 
Copperhead Daniel Voorhees, Cox nevertheless broke with Valladigham and Voorhees 
over the issue of linking war resistance to Lincoln resistance.  Joel Silbey notes in A 
Respectable Majority that Cox believed the nominations of Valladigham, Thomas S. 
Seymour, and George Woodward for governor in Ohio, Connecticut and Pennsylvania, 
respectively, would ultimately backfire.  All were known to have ‘anti-war tendencies’, 
and although Cox was a Democrat deeply opposed to the Lincoln administration and the 
Republicans, he sensed the Purists nominations would be tainted by their long association 
with the antiwar effort. “ We are making a fierce fight, but we carry weights,” Cox wrote 
in August 1863.7  The New York Sun agreed.  On July 27th its editor noted a speech by 
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Confederate Vice President Alexander Stephens, made in the aftermath of the southern 
losses at Gettysburg and Vicksburg, and used it to frame his response: 
Northern peace men have persistently proclaimed that the rebel leaders were 
prepared to make peace on the basis of reconstruction of the Union, under 
a proper guarantee that the provisions of the Constitution on the subject of 
slavery will be adhered to, and the rights of the States over their domestic 
institutions shall not be interfered with. 
That these assertions have no foundation, is apparent in the almost 
unanimity of the Southern leaders upon the present condition of their 
rebellion.  Whipped upon every battlefield, apparently used up in men and 
materials, the unconquerable Southerners still refuse to listen to moderate 
counsels, and continue to affirm that nothing but a final and complete 
separation from the North will ensure peace.8  
 
Valladigham arrived in Halifax, Nova Scotia on the 5th of July and continued to 
Niagara Falls.  There, according to his brother, he was greeted by a ‘host’ of British 
admirers, as well as fellow Copperhead Daniel Voorhees and other Democrats.9  After 
three weeks, he moved to Windsor, Ontario and there remained until his surreptitious 
return to the United States the following year. 
On the 15th of July he sent an open letter to the Democrats of Ohio.  Published in 
Democratic newspapers across the North, Valladigham triumphantly declared himself 
returned to the North, albeit in Canada, and thanked and accepted the Democrats for their 
nomination of him for governor.  He reiterated he was unchanged in politics and opinions 
and closed with the following: “I return, therefore, with my opinions and convictions as 
to war and peace, and my faith as to the final results from sound policy and wise 
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statesmanship, not only unchanged, but confirmed and strengthened.”10 Many Democrats 
in Ohio agreed with Valladigham and saw the 1863 gubernatorial election, as well as 
other elections across the North, as a rallying point.  The Ohio newspaper The Ashland 
Union wrote on July 22nd: 
We are about entering upon the most important political campaign that ever 
invited the attention of the people of Ohio. The issue is squarely made 
before the people.  A centralized government with a military despotism and 
the overthrow of all the Constitutional and legal rights of the people, upon 
the one hand, and upon the other, free press, free speech, the enforcement 
of the laws and the restorations of the old Constitution and the old Union. 
If we fail now the last hope of Liberty and the Republic is gone, gone 
forever.  This is the issue, and it overshadows in importance all other public 
interests and all private questions.  No Democrat in after years will regret 
it, if he commences at this time, and laying aside all other business, will 
work for the success of the Democratic party and its time-honored 
principles, until after the election in October. [original italics]11  
 
As the Democrats prepared for the Fall elections, many failed to note the change 
in the electorate at large.  Samuel Cox and his Legitimists were correct in fearing the 
peace platform message was no longer resonating as it once had.  Union victories and the 
horrors committed by the New York City draft rioters had the dual effect of restoring 
confidence in their military and equating Democratic war resistance to street thuggery.  
Support for the Democrats was gradually eroding, but reinforced by like-minded 
supporters, the Democrats were increasingly blinded by their own rhetoric and tribal 
newspapers.  Nicolay and Hay, in Abraham Lincoln: A History, wrote of the period:  
“Certainly, throughout the whole summer of 1863, they [Democrats] fought their losing 
battle with a courage and determination equal to that which their sympathizers were 
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displaying in the South.  But the very energy and malice with which they carried on the 
contest roused the loyal people of the North to still greater efforts and increased the 
dimensions of their ultimate triumph.”12    
Frank Klement notes some Copperhead positions changed with Gettysburg and 
Vicksburg, but in a strange way.   The editor of the Democratic newspaper Illinois State 
Register, Charles H. Lanphier, saw the victories as an opportunity to extend an olive 
branch to the South.  He proposed a presidential proclamation of full amnesty to the 
rebellious states and hoped it would provide enough incentive to end the hostilities and 
restore the Confederacy to the Union.  Other Democrats also liked the idea of presidential 
amnesty and thought it would inspire latent unionism in the South and provide an 
opportunity for compromise and peace.  Many, perhaps most, and certainly Valladigham, 
remained unflinching in their traditional messaging as the elections approached.13  
October 1863 was a watershed moment for the nation.  One can argue there were 
many such moments, but Lincoln had a particularly important voice then and now and to 
him, at least according to Nicolay and Hay, this election was perhaps the most important 
of the war.  Across the gubernatorial contests, Democrats were soundly defeated.  
Klement notes this was not by accident.  Republicans had recognized just how critical 
these elections, and the ones following in November, would be to the Union.  
Valladigham in particular was attacked.  Republicans accused him of treason and 
lampooned him as a southern sympathizer and convicted traitor.  They printed a tract 
entitled The Peace Democracy, Alias Copperheads that described him as “a man of 
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morbid prejudices” and “excess vanity” and claimed that Valladigham had assured 
Jefferson Davis that the Northwest was ready to rebel.  He was accused of treason and 
labeled a “sympathizer with the rebels” and “a convicted traitor”.   Creative opponents 
forged a letter purportedly written by Valladigham while in the South and had it 
published in the Detroit Advertiser and Tribune.  It quickly circulated.  In it he stated his 
hatred for the North and his hope for a southern victory.  Although bitterly refuted by the 
Democrats, it was republished across the North and continued to resonate into the polling 
booth.  Nothing was left to chance.14  
On October 14th, 1863, Gideon Welles recorded the following in his diary: 
The election results from Pennsylvania and Ohio are cheering in their 
results.  The loyal and patriotic sentiment is strongly in the ascendant in 
both states, and the defeat of Valladigham is emphatic.  I stopped in to see 
the President, who is in good spirits and greatly relieved from the depression 
of yesterday. He told me he had more anxiety in regard to the election results 
of yesterday than he had in 1860 when he was chosen. He could not, he said, 
have believed four years ago, that one genuine American would, or could 
be induced to vote for a man like Valladigham, yet he has been the candidate 
of a large party – their representative man, and has received a vote that is a 
discredit to the country.  The President showed a great deal of emotion as 
he dwelt on this subject, and his regrets were sincere.15  
 
Silbey in A Respectable Majority notes the Legitimists felt a great opportunity for 
the Democrats had been lost.  They were convinced most Americans were ‘disgusted’ 
with the Lincoln administration and its politics and ready for a change.  The Purists 
fixation on the war and its immediate stop had given the Republicans a means to divert 
attention away from what Democrats believed were failed Republican politics.  Instead, 
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the Republicans successfully paired the Democrats with the Confederacy, claiming the 
two were in league with one another.  The average Union soldier agreed, and with 
considerable help from General Grant, 43,000 Ohio soldiers returned to cast their votes 
for John Brough.  Yet even without the soldier vote, Brough won handily against 
Valladigham.16  
Nicolay and Hay wrote of the elections: 
In Ohio the contest was marked with equal bitterness and enthusiasm.  The 
Democrats, working against hope but with undaunted persistency for their 
banished candidate, Valladigham, were buried under the portentous 
majority of one hundred thousand votes.  This overwhelming triumph of the 
Union party in the October States made success certain in the general 
election of the next month. The tide had turned, and the current now swept 
steadily onward in one way….Throughout the West the Union sentiment 
asserted itself with irresistible strength.17  
 
 According to Doris Kearns Goodwin in Team of Rivals, Lincoln spent election 
night in the telegraph office, just as he had done in battles past.  By 5am, after receiving 
an exultant telegram from Salmon Chase in Ohio that proclaimed a great victory, Lincoln 
telegraphed the governor-elect John Brough with the message: “Glory to God in the 
highest.  Ohio has saved the Union.”18  
The aftershocks were deep and acutely felt by both parties.   Democratic 
newspapers in Ohio were quick to lament the loss.  The Dayton Daily Empire, long an 
advocate of the Copperheads and Valladigham, wrote on October 14th:  “The people of 
Ohio, by their votes, have decided for war, taxation, conscription and despotism.  It is 
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their choice, and they cannot complain when it comes upon them, in all its force as it 
surely will. Would to heaven it were otherwise.”   The paper further opined: 
Well, the Gubernatorial Contest is over ; we have met the enemy - and we 
are theirs!  The returns of the votes cast on yesterday indicate, as far as 
received, the election of John Brough by a large majority.  As a matter of 
course, this result is painful to us, deeply sensible, as we have been, of the 
vast importance of the issues involved in the canvas - upon which no less 
than the Union's restoration depended. The election of Brough is an 
indorsement, by the people of Ohio, of the radical measures of Lincoln's 
Administration, and at once prolongs the present war and, to that extent, 
diminishes the hope of a final reestablishment of the unity of the Country.19  
 
 The Ashland Union was equally bitter, and alleged the vote had been rigged, 
Democratic voters intimidated and the soldier vote skewed to favor John Brough.  Its 
editors also predicted dark times for the nation, and cautioned its readers to proceed 
carefully, for the forces of Abolitionism were already promoting, within Ohio, ‘the 
surging waves of fratricidal war.’20   
 Republican papers in Ohio were exuberant.  The Cleveland Morning Leader 
wrote: “OHIO IS TRUE TO THE UNION.  Thank God for the glad tidings of great joy 
that the telegraph has already sent throughout the land from the Buckeye State. The hosts 
of treason and of sin have been overwhelmed and defeated. The Union cause is 
triumphant, and the country is saved. Amen and amen.”21 The Tiffin Weekly Tribune said 
much the same: “We feel thankful to the Supreme Being for another manifestation of his 
loving kindness to our beloved country, in discomfiting our enemies, by overturning their 
deep laid plan to array our noble State in opposition to the General Government….the 
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dirty traitor Valladigham with his aiders and abettors are beaten in Ohio by a majority of 
50,000 to 100,000 votes!”22    
Beyond Ohio, and Lincoln, the defeat of the Democrats, and particularly 
Valladigham, was cause for celebration amongst Republicans.  On October 23rd, the 
Oxford Democrat in Maine showed little mercy in its denunciation of Valladigham and 
the Copperheads: 
Clement Laird Valladigham, an atrocious traitor, for advocating armed 
opposition to the administration was arrested and tried and sent out of the 
country. The Copperhead leaders seized upon his arrest and at once in Ohio 
and all the other States, undertook to manufacturing political capital for 
their party. Everywhere they made common cause with this infamous villain 
and mourned over his fate, as a mother mourns for her first born. The verdict 
of the people of Ohio  has been given by tens of thousands heaped upon tens 
of thousands in favor of the administration and against the vile wretch who 
plotted his country’s ruin, and all of his debased and deluded followers.23 
 
 Last, the southern reaction was muted.  The Richmond Enquirer did not mention 
the elections in any of its October editions.  The Richmond Daily Dispatch mentioned the 
results matter-of-factly on October 17th, posting an article from the New York Herald 
without editorial comment.24  The Staunton Spectator, on October 20th, posted the 
following, clearly with a wisp of regret:  “The Gubernatorial elections took place in Ohio, 
Pennsylvania and Iowa, on last Tuesday, the 13th inst. These elections have gone as we 
expected, but not as we wished. The Republicans have succeeded. In Ohio, Brough 
defeated Vallandigham, and in Pennsylvania, Gov. Curtin, defeated Judge Woodward.”25 
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Valladigham went from candidate to scapegoat, and quickly.  According to Frank 
Klement, Democrats needed someone or something to blame for their unexpected 
reversal of fortune.  He notes some Democrats set about reorganizing their regional 
parties and exorcising the Valladigham element.  Klement quotes one unnamed 
Copperhead who declared:  “The people have voted in favor of the war and the way it is 
at present conducted and it has to go on course.  The case went to the jury and they have 
rendered their verdict and I am not disposed to move for a new trial.”26   
Jennifer Weber argues the Democrats were stung, but not fatally.  Certainly, there 
was an abundance of finger-pointing, but many Democrats viewed the election results 
more as a setback than a fatal blow. The contrast between the Democratic success in 1862 
and the Democratic failure a year later was less damning when viewed holistically.  
There had been some gains – many counties across the North remained firmly 
Democratic.   Loss margins still indicated substantial support for the Democrats, an 
observation that deeply bothered Lincoln.27 Valladigham thought it was all a combination 
of bad timing and vote manipulation.  In his concession letter to the people of Ohio, he 
urged the Democrats not to despair.  They had fought well and hard and that “the 
conspiracy of the 5th of May [his arrest] fell before you.”28  Last, the prominent 
Copperhead historian, Joel Silbey, views the Democratic fracture between the Purists and 
Legitimists as a logical predeterminant of failure.  Internal divisions had hurt the 
Democrats at precisely the moment a unified party was needed.  The 1862 elections had 
been successful due, in large measure, to the singular voice of the Democratic party.  
 
26 Klement, The Copperheads in the Middle West, 131-132 
27 Weber, Copperheads, 122-123 





1863’s fractures had weakened Democratic messaging in the face of a strengthening 
opposition, emboldened by military victories and a successful campaign to discredit the 
Democrats whenever and wherever they could.29 Regardless of the reason, Silbey, 
Klement and Weber agree the Democrats, and certainly Valladigham, were severely 
weakened by the October and November 1863 elections.  In the disappointing aftermath 
of defeat, the Democrats saw the presidential election in 1864 as their last, best hope for 
redemption. 
Valladigham had remained in Canada throughout the election, and now there was 
little incentive for that to change.  James Valladigham writes little about the span of time 
between November 1863 and March of 1864.  Apart from a typically long Valladigham 
speech in November of 1863 to a group of Michigan schoolboys in Canada, Clement 
Valladigham was curiously quiet from late November 1863 until the spring of 1864.  
James Valladigham attributes this quietude to Clement Valladigham’s desire for exercise, 
study and reflection.  He further observed that Union agents were quite vigilant – the U.S. 
gunboat Michigan with “loaded cannon and steam up, lay opposite his bedroom for four 
weeks, while a score of detectives, provided with his photograph, kept watch in every 
public place.”30 
In February of 1864, the Confederate Secret Service began to focus on 
opportunities in the North.  The Confederates were especially intrigued by the size and 
apparent belligerence of the newly formed Sons of Liberty, a secret society formed by 
Democrats to hide their discussions and activities from prying Republican eyes.  Born 
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from a secretive society known as the Knights of the Golden Circle (K.G.C.), formed 
between 1853 and 1855 and predominantly southern, the K.G.C. was dedicated to the 
absorption of Cuba, Mexico and other territories into a vast, self-supporting slave-based 
empire.31 When secession stripped the organization of its southern members, purpose and 
legitimacy, northern members, exclusively Democrats, decided in 1862 to change its 
name and charter and become the Order of American Knights (O.A.K.).   Driven by a 
perceived (and arguably justified) need to protect themselves from the Federal 
government and hostile Republicans and the oft-enumerated abuses Democrats had 
suffered at their hands (the Dayton Daily Empire in each edition published a list of ‘The 
Doctrines We Advocate” that addressed the routine suspension of the writ of habeas 
corpus, free speech, etc. on page two), its members adopted secret rituals and codes.32  In 
1862 and again in early 1863, Valladigham was invited to join, but declined.  According 
to his brother James, Valladigham was wary of any association with an organization that 
had its origins in the South.  He had been routinely accused by his political opponents of 
having southern sympathies, if not outright collusion with the Confederates.  Further, his 
brother insists Valladigham’s patriotism and fidelity to the Constitution prevented him 
from joining any cause that potentially threatened the government of the United States.33 
Valladigham was wise not to join.   
In early 1864, he changed his mind.  James Valladigham cites Valladigham’s 
arrest and exile as the catalyst.  He wrote: 
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He [Clement Valladigham] was not long in making known to parties 
interested his views on the subject; and in conversation with members of 
the Order of American Knights in the early part of 1864, he communicated 
to them the information that if he was allowed the privilege of modifying 
any objectionable features in its constitution, and if the whole thing was 
remodeled, he would be willing to join it.34  
  
Valladigham met with a Mr. Green and a Dr. James A. Barret in Canada in the 
middle of February 1864.  In his testimony in May of 1865 to the Military Commission in 
Indianapolis, convened to try L.P. Milligan and other members of the Sons of Liberty for 
treason, Valladigham described the course of the meeting.  Valladigham insisted the two 
men had described the organization as a merely political one, well within the 
Constitutional boundaries of good and defensible conduct and only necessary to protect 
its members from Republican abuse.  He told them that if that were so, he would join, for 
whereas “I had always hitherto opposed them as a member of the Democratic party, now 
I believed the time had come when they were useful and necessary, provided they were 
kept legitimate and lawful.”  The two men departed, went to New York to meet with the 
‘Supreme Council of their Order’ and while there, formed a new organization, the Sons 
of Liberty.  On the 1st of March Mr. H.H. Dodd and Dr. Massey visited Valladigham in 
Canada and presented him with news of the new organization and informed him he had 
been selected to be its leader.  Seeing nothing objectionable, Valladigham agreed and 
took the oath of office as the Grand Commander of the Sons of Liberty.  Later, during the 
Indianapolis Trials in 1865, he insisted he had never been presented with a printed copy 
of the organization’s charter.35  
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Nicolay and Hay wrote contemptuously of these northern secret organizations.  
They found them cowardly, and felt they were populated by the most base and vulgar 
Democrats.  They estimated they numbered between 500,000 and 1,000,000 and were 
strongest in Indiana and Illinois.  Ohio, Kentucky and Missouri also had substantial 
numbers.  The authors note the naming evolutions were swift and confusing, and the path 
to the Sons of Liberty had begun with the Knights of the Golden Circle, next the Order of 
American Knights, followed by the Order of the Star until they settled on the Sons of 
Liberty.  The Sons were militarily structured, with each state commanded by a ‘major 
general’, each congressional district by a brigadier, each county by a colonel and each 
town a captain.  They were armed.  Nicolay and Hay claim thirty thousand guns and 
revolvers were brought into Indiana by the organization.  Illinois was also well armed and 
by March 1864, the Federal government estimated 340,000 armed men could be mustered 
from the various states.  Fortunately, the Sons of Liberty were active in recruiting 
dissatisfied soldiers, and many Federal informants and agents using that path were 
intentionally embedded in the organization and provided valuable intelligence to the 
government. Nicolay and Hay wrote:  “The order was large enough at least to offer the 
fullest hospitality to detectives and to Union men who volunteered to join with the 
purpose of reporting what they could to the authorities.”36 
Of greatest interest to the government was the Sons of Liberty’s greatest 
weakness – its organizational documents.  The charter contained the usual oaths and 
rituals, as well as a constitution that restated the preamble to the Declaration of 
Independence to clearly reflect the distinction between equality for white people and 
 





equality for blacks.  It further made a disturbing reference to state rights.  Nicolay and 
Hay elaborate: “They also declare in favor of something they imagine to be the theory of 
State rights, and also the duty of the people to expel their rulers from the government by 
force of arms when they see good reason. “This is not a revolution,” they say,” but solely 
the assertion of right.”37 Their charter was not a well-kept secret, as were most activities 
they engaged in, resulting in a Federal government as knowledgeable of their activities as 
they were.  James Valladigham noted in May 1864 that “there was scarcely anything of 
general importance made known to the members of the organization that was not 
immediately communicated to the Administration, and he [Clement Valladigham] soon 
wearied of a system which had in it the element of secrecy which provokes obloquy 
without any of the advantages which flow from concealment and reticence in political 
affairs.”38 
Of greatest concern to the government were the efforts the Sons of Liberty made 
to encourage draft resistance and desertion.  Nicolay and Hay observed: 
One of their chief objects was the excitement of discontent in the army and 
the encouraging of desertion; members of the order enlisted with the 
expressed purpose of inciting soldiers to desert with them; money and 
citizens clothing were furnished them for this purpose; lawyers were hired 
to advise soldiers on leave not to go back, and to promise them the requisite 
defense in the courts if they got into trouble by desertion… The squads of 
soldiers sent to arrest deserters were frequently attacked in rural districts by 
these organized bodies; the most violent resistance was made to the 
enrollment and the draft.”39  
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In May, Valladigham met with Confederate agents.  It is during this period that 
James Valladigham’s writing becomes the most suspect.  James insists that in ‘the latter 
part of May’ his brother’s ‘interview’ with an unidentified Confederate agent was 
amiable, and that during that interview the agent had reiterated the Confederate position 
that any alliance with the ‘Democrats of the Northwest’ be made with the recognition of 
the Confederacy’s absolute separation from the Union.  James further insists Valladigham 
then met with one of his Sons of Liberty subordinates who revealed to him that he and 
others were in favor of assisting the Confederacy and accepting their terms, and that they 
further advocated the possible admission of the western states into a new Union.  
Valladigham then became ‘violently excited’ and denounced “the stupidity of the men 
who were willing to precipitate a revolution and fight for a government which, if 
successful in accomplishing its independence, would consider them aliens and outcasts.”  
James Valladigham ended his brother’s long harangue with Clement Valladigham 
declaring he would report all such intrigue to the Lincoln administration “If I hear of any 
further developments, under existing circumstances, of attempts of members of our order 
to assist the Southern Government.”40  
The version offered by Confederate agent John W. Headley is much different.  
Headley, in his 1906 war memoir Confederate Operations in Canada and New York, 
recalls multiple meetings with Valladigham.  The first, and probably the one James 
Valladigham cites above, was with Captain T. Henry Hines on the 9th of June.  It’s 
content and outcome are not mentioned by Headley, but one presumes the outcome was 
favorable because on the 11th of June, Valladigham met with the commander of 
 





Confederate Secret Service operations in the North, Colonel Jacob Thompson. Headley 
asserts the two men “thoroughly discussed the existing dissatisfaction, which had already 
crystallized into the semi-military organization known as the ‘Sons of Liberty’.  Mr. 
Valladigham stated he was the Grand Commander of this order, and that he claimed it 
was, in all, three hundred thousand strong.  There were eighty-five thousand members, he 
said, in Illinois, fifty thousand in Indiana, and forty thousand in Ohio.”  Valladigham then 
introduced Colonel Thompson to his ‘adjutant general’, and “through this gentleman Mr. 
Thompson subsequently arranged for the distribution of funds to be used in arming and 
mobilizing the county organizations.”41 
Headley recounts subsequent conversations between Confederate agents and 
unidentified Northern men in Canada who were not affiliated with the Sons of Liberty.  
They confirmed the great dissatisfaction many northerners felt towards the war and that 
there was a “widespread feeling of fatigue, to use the mildest term, with the war and 
those who were profiting by it.”  Headley continues: 
A subsequent investigation of the character and sentiment of the “Sons of 
Liberty” confirmed perfectly all that Mr. Valladigham has said, and 
revealed a feverish desire of the general membership to assert and maintain 
their rights….Mr. Thompson became thoroughly convinced that the 
movement could be induced, and that it would be successful. But there was 
always doubt whether men bound together merely by political affiliations 
and oaths, behind which there was no real legal authority, could be handled 
like an army.”42  
 
 John Headley’s record of Confederate interactions with Valladigham dramatically 
contradict much of what either James or Clement Valladigham subsequently claimed to 
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be true.  On June 15th, 1864, Valladigham slipped across the Canadian/United States 
border in disguise to begin preparations for the Democratic Convention in August.   In 
Hamilton, Ohio, on the day he returned from exile, Valladigham gave a speech that 
Headley found noteworthy, especially the following excerpt:  “But I warn the men in 
power that there is a vast multitude, a host whom they cannot number, bound together by 
the strongest and holiest ties, to defend, by whatever means the exigencies of the times 
shall demand, their natural and constitutional rights as freemen, at all hazards and to the 
last extremity.”43  Perhaps equally ominous, the Dayton Daily Empire published the 
speech in its entirety, and its closing paragraph was no less inflammatory: “Three years 
have now passed, Men of Ohio, and the great issue Constitutional Liberty and Free 
Popular Government is still before you. To you I again commit it, confident that in this 
time of their greatest peril, you will be found worthy of the ancestors who for so many 
ages in England and America, on the field, in prison and on the scaffold, defended them 
against tyrants and usurpers whether in councils or in arms.”44 
By Headley’s account, Clement Valladigham had done much to encourage the 
Confederates.  According to Headley, the Confederates had been assured the Sons of 
Liberty would lead an uprising and its planned date and place was the Democratic 
Convention in Chicago on the 29th of August.  But the Confederates had privately voiced 
their suspicions that the Sons of Liberty were less reliable and capable than they claimed.  
Although numerically large, the organization and its diverse membership was loosely 
controlled by a diffused and democratic command structure, one that defied rather than 
 
43 Headley, Confederate Operations in Canada and New York, 223 





aided effective military operations.  On the 8th of August, Colonel Thompson received a 
letter from the Sons of Liberty that indicated cold feet, stating “We are willing to do 
anything which bids fair result in good, but shrink from the responsibility of a movement 
made in the way now proposed, and have concluded to frankly communicate this to you.”  
It went on to assure the Confederates that “By patience and perseverance in the work of 
agitation we are sure of a general uprising which will result in a glorious success.  We 
must look to bigger results than the mere liberation of prisoners.  We should look to the 
grand end of adding an empire of Northwestern States.” 45 
The Confederate agents were still hopeful the Sons of Liberty would do 
something.  It was announced 3000 Union soldiers would be on hand for the Democratic 
Convention to ensure security, and the Democrats interpreted their presence as intended 
Republican interference on a scale they had not yet witnessed.  Convinced the presence 
of Union troops would provide the necessary provocation, the Confederates believed the 
Sons of Liberty would find their courage and respond as the agents hoped.  Headley 
states: “Mr. Valladigham’s representatives were furnished means for transportation, and 
had ample time to make proper distribution and explain to the more faithful and 
courageous county commanders why the rank and file should come to Chicago and resist 
any further attempt on the liberties of the citizens.”46 Headley goes on to observe: 
Men commended to us by Mr. Valladigham had been entrusted with the 
necessary funds for perfecting the county organizations; arms had been 
purchased in the North by the aid of our professed friends in New York; 
alliances offensive and defensive had been made with peace organizations, 
and though we were not misled by the sanguine promises of our friends, we 
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were confidant that with any sort of cooperation on their part success was 
reasonably possible.47   
 
On the eve of the convention, the Confederates were in Chicago in their promised, 
albeit small, numbers.  Headley claims many of the county officers of the Sons of Liberty 
were also there, actively aiding the Confederates and assuring them of larger support.  On 
the night of 28 August, recognizing it was essential to know just how large the Sons of 
Liberty contingent would be, and knowing how disastrous things would turn if the 
promised numbers were not present, the Confederates and their Sons of Liberty 
counterparts met at the Richmond house in Chicago.  Exaggerations of Union troop 
numbers had circulated amongst the organization, and the Sons of Liberty now balked at 
the thought of a bloodbath.  Further, it was clear to the Confederates the Sons of Liberty 
were dramatically unrepresented and that their numbers, regardless of courage, were 
insufficient to the task.  The attack was aborted and the Confederates dispersed.48 
A reasonable understanding of Clement Valladigham; his ego, his preferences, his 
public influence, political ambition and more, all put Headley’s account in doubt.  
Valladigham knew well before the time he met with Confederate agents he would play a 
dominant role at the Democratic Convention.  It is also important to note at the end of 
August 1864, the Democrats were not desperate.  Rather, they believed the Republicans 
were the party on the boxer’s ropes, and that within the state and national electoral 
framework they could achieve their goals.   It is therefore extremely unlikely 
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Valladigham would try to sabotage a convention at which he knew he would be a leading, 
guiding star. 
Regardless, Headley’s recollection of Confederate interaction with the Sons of 
Liberty and their subsequent schemes does severely indict Vallandigham.  It is entirely 
possible, perhaps probable, that after the initial meetings between the Confederate agents 
and Valladigham, Valladigham had abandoned the Sons of Liberty and all that remained 
was his name.  Yet if the Confederate agents and Valladigham only met on the 9th and 
11th of June, that alone provided enough encouragement to the Confederates to engage in 
fund transfers to the Sons of Liberty (which Headley insists were accepted) that led to 
arms purchases in New York as well as in the Midwest, as well as detailed combined 
planning up to the eve of the event.  If only half, or a quarter, of what Headley claimed 
was true, the evidence is damning to Valladigham.49 
The political landscape during the summer of 1864 was troubling for the 
Republicans.   The Republican euphoria of October 1863 had dissipated with military 
disappointments.  The Union army in the West had moved ever eastward and was now 
commanded by General William T. Sherman.  Sherman was slowed by stubborn 
resistance from a Confederate army commanded by General Joe Johnson, and all the 
northern press found noteworthy were the mounting Union casualties. 
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Concurrent with Sherman’s campaign in the South, and with similar results, 
Grant’s campaign in Virginia produced effusions of blood and battles without victory, at 
least in the northern public eye.  The Battle of the Wilderness had been as grim as 
Chancellorsville had been in 1863 and ended with a similar tactical outcome.  The Army 
of the Potomac had been stopped and a calloused northern press expected another retreat 
and another general, as seemed all too routine.  But Grant was a different animal, and 
following the battle he maneuvered south, not north.  Spotsylvania Court House was next 
and also produced horrifying casualties, ending with battle lines largely unchanged from 
the battle’s beginning.  But the tenacious Grant again maneuvered south, and the Army of 
Northern Virginia was compelled to do likewise.  The North, and the Army of the 
Potomac, began to view Grant with guarded optimism and saw in him, as Lincoln most 
certainly did, a grit the Army of the Potomac had long needed.  But that approbation was 
severely tested at Cold Harbor, where entrenched Confederates inflicted 7,000 Union 
casualties in a scant thirty minutes.50 
In the days following that battle, the Democratic press called him a butcher and 
demanded his removal, but Lincoln was unswerving in his support and Grant remained in 
command and continued south.  The two armies finally settled into opposing siege lines 
at Petersburg, and the horrors and malaise of trench life quickly effected both sides.  
Inspired by a plan to mine and explode the southern lines, and himself frustrated by the 
stagnation that had often proved to be his worst personal opponent, Grant gave the miners 
his sanction and on the 30th of July 1864, the mine was detonated.  The Confederate 
 






entrenchments erupted and created a hole thirty feet deep and easily twice that in width.  
A portion of Grant’s army attacked but with disastrous consequences.  The assault 
bogged down in the hole, the Confederates recovered from their shock and systematically 
murdered the Union attackers who could not escape.51 
Lincoln was once again confronted by an angry, frustrated electorate.  His 
subsequent call for hundreds of thousands of new troops seemed more indicative of 
failure than success.  In the glow of lost battles and growing northern dissatisfaction with 
the war, an energized Democratic party sensed a renewed viability and a restored public 
appetite for their peace platform.  Even among his allies, war weariness was having an 
effect.  As criticism of Lincoln grew, so did opposition within his own party.  
In Cleveland, Ohio, at the end of May 1864, dissatisfied Republicans gathered in 
advance of the Republican nominating convention scheduled for June 7th in Baltimore, 
Maryland.  They felt the goals of the Republican party had been obfuscated and 
weakened by the exigencies of a poorly led war and that Lincoln was to blame.  They 
dismissed what they believed would be a predetermined nomination of Lincoln in 
Baltimore and demanded new leadership.  Some recommended the nomination of John C. 
Freemont to replace Lincoln on the ballot, sensing what the nation needed was a greater 
resolve to eradicate slavery in all its manifestations.  Nicolay and Hay wrote 
disparagingly of the convention and its members, and noted the gathering was fractured 
from its raucous beginning to its inconclusive end.  Its proposals swerved dangerously 
across the political landscape, promoting Radical Republican precepts at one turn, and 
 





then curiously Democratic Party principles the next.  Its clear dissatisfaction with Lincoln 
and promises of greater fidelity to the Constitution attracted the attention of the 
Democratic press, who then, to the dismay of the attendees, widely distributed reports of 
the proceedings and enthusiastically endorsed the convention.52  The rabidly Democratic 
Dayton Daily Empire reported on June 2nd:   “The Democratic Plaindealer [Cleveland 
newspaper] is in ecstasy over the Convention. This afternoon's paper describes the hotels 
as full of strangers, the streets jammed and passage along the avenue out of the question.  
It rejoices that justice is to be done to a victim of the Presidential tyranny.  The day it 
says marks an epoch - the death knell of Lincoln’s ambitions.”53   
The convention concluded inconclusively.  Its platform barely diverged from the 
overall purpose and conduct of the war under Lincoln.  Its main provisions were: “the 
Union must and shall be preserved, the Constitutional laws of the United States must be 
obeyed, the Rebellion must be suppressed by force of arms and without compromise.” 
Nicolay and Hay noted  “the platform did not greatly differ from that subsequently 
adopted at Baltimore, except it spoke in favor of one Presidential term, declared that to 
Congress instead of the President belonged the question of reconstruction, and advocated 
the confiscation of the property of the rebels and its distribution among the soldiers.”54 
It ended with the nomination of John C. Freemont for President and John C. 
Cochran for Vice President on the Radical Democracy Party ticket.  The Republican 
rebellion lasted two months.  Recognizing they had little popular support and that through 
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vote diffusion they endangered Republican Party success in November, Cochran removed 
himself from the ticket in late September, shortly followed by Freemont.55 
Another act of Republican dissension served to deepen Lincoln’s reelection woes.  
Horace Greeley, the editor of the New York Daily Tribune and a fair-weather Lincoln 
supporter, began in July to entreat Lincoln to consider a Confederate peace proposal.  He 
had, according to Nicolay and Hay, offered to Lincoln by letter, editorial and more, an 
opportunity to send an empowered representative of the United States government to 
Niagara Falls, Canada to meet with equally empowered representatives of the 
Confederate government.  Greeley was convinced what he had heard from a neutral 
intermediary indicated a true Confederate willingness to negotiate peace.  Greeley 
insisted the war had produced little more than profuse bleeding and that peace deserved 
equal consideration from Lincoln.  Lincoln, sensitive to the mounting northern criticism 
of the war, wrote to Greeley on July 9th and said: “ If you can find any person, anywhere, 
professing to have any proposition of Jefferson Davis in writing, for peace, embracing the 
restoration of the Union, and the abandonment of slavery, whatever else it embraces, say 
to him he may come to me with you…”56 
Greeley served as the intermediary throughout, causing Lincoln far more damage 
than good.  The two Confederate representatives were Clement Clay and Jacob 
Holcombe, assisted by George Sanders and Beverly Tucker, and none of them were 
empowered by Jefferson Davis to do anything.   Regardless, Greeley was obstinate 
enough to look past their lack of authority and recommend a more earnest effort by 
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Lincoln.  Although Nicolay and Hay insist it should have been apparent to Greeley the 
Confederates were diplomatically impotent, Greeley was adamant Lincoln should take 
full advantage of the opportunity.57 On July 18th, Lincoln sent Major Hay to Niagara Falls 
with a letter addressed To Whom it May Concern.  Lincoln wrote: 
Any proposition that embraces the restoration of peace, the integrity of the 
whole Union, and the abandonment of slavery, and which come by and with 
an authority which can control the armies now at war against the United 
States, will be received and considered by the executive Government of the 
United States, and will be met by liberal terms on other substantial and 
collateral points, and the bearer or bearer thereof shall have safe conduct 
both ways.  
Abraham Lincoln58 
  The affair was as torturously protracted as it was unproductive, lasting much of 
July and going well into August.  Greeley had meddled where he should not and could 
not and had produced events and correspondence ultimately damaging to the President.  
Lincoln’s July 18th letter was dutifully delivered by Hay to the Confederates in Canada, 
who then communicated its’ contents to Davis in Richmond on July 25th in a letter 
cosigned by Clay and Holcombe.59 They also ensured it was published, and it quickly 
received the North’s attention.  Clear to the northern reader was Lincoln’s clear linkage 
of the war to ending slavery, and his refusal to consider peace without slavery’s abolition.  
It destroyed any lingering belief that emancipation was only applicable to belligerent 
states, and there only while those states remained unsubdued.  To the public, Lincoln had 
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clearly rejected peace when it had been sincerely offered, according to Greeley.60 The 
resulting clamor provided renewed energy to the Democrats. 
 One curious adjunct to the Niagara Falls fiasco was a private effort to sound out 
Jefferson Davis on peace.  Lincoln saw no harm in the effort and allowed James F. 
Jaquess, a Methodist minister and James R. Gilmore, Jaquess’ friend and a novelist, to go 
to Richmond, but insisted the delegation could claim no association with the Federal 
government.  On July 16th, they met with Jefferson Davis and Judah Benjamin, the 
Confederate Secretary of State.  Davis ‘terminated’ the meeting after two hours and 
declared he had “no disposition to discuss questions of state with such persons, especially 
as they bore no credentials” and further stated “we are not fighting for slavery.  We are 
fighting for Independence, -- and that, or extermination, we shall have.”61 Although 
Lincoln had given the duo no official sanction, news of the mission made its way into the 
press and fueled public criticism of the president.  
The months following the June Republican nominating convention in Baltimore 
were bleak for Lincoln.  The effect of the Republican defection in Cleveland did not fully 
dissipate until the end of September and the Greeley affair had further sabotaged his 
reelection chances, as had the rebuffed delegation to Richmond.  Gideon Welles wrote in 
his diary: 
I am sadly oppressed with the aspect of things.  Have just read the account 
of the interview at Richmond between Jaques(s) and Gilmore on one side 
and Jeff Davis and Benjamin on the other. Davis asserts an ultimatum that 
is inadmissible, and the President in his note [July 18th To Whom it May 
Concern letter] which appears to me not as considerate and well-advised as 
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it should have been, interposes barriers that were unnecessary…. They place 
the president moreover at disadvantage in the coming election. He is 
committed it will be claimed, against peace, except on terms that are 
inadmissible.62 
 
 In Wisconsin, The Manitowoc Pilot was one of the many Democratic papers in 
that state and throughout the North to echo Gideon Welles’s concerns.  On the 23rd of 
September, after endorsing George McClellan for President, its editor dismissed 
Lincoln’s peace fiasco: 
We give no credit to rumors that Mr. Lincoln is in some sort entertaining 
the idea of offering an armistice to the South. The rumors are a trick to break 
the force of his “ To whom it may concern” manifesto. That manifesto is 
the settled policy of the administration, if it has any settled policy. It is the 
policy of the emancipation proclamation. It is the policy which from the 
beginning has been the purpose of the dominant element in the republican 
party, and from which Mr. Lincoln cannot recede without detaching from 
his support the sole power which sustains him, and whose defection would 
take away the last dim chance of his reelection.63 
 
Frank Klement notes in The Copperheads in the Middle West the ‘rebirth’ of the 
Copperheads was temporary.  Their resurgence in popularity required all that has been 
noted in this study, and arguably more.  The military became their leading actor, 
shedding blood and producing casualties sufficient to shock the general electorate.  
Shocked by Grant’s continued casualties, and further shocked by Sherman’s, many 
northerners wondered whether the Union could be reestablished by war.  Democrats had 
been delighted by the Cleveland defection and had used it to their best advantage.  
Lincoln’s Greeley episode had also not helped.  But Lincoln as ever proved himself to be 
the master stateman, and he was able to spin the clumsy peace initiatives that had initially 
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gone so badly.  He convincingly argued the South had rejected the peace overtures, and it 
was the South that made slavery the paramount issue of the war.  Yes, Lincoln argued, 
the war was about slavery, as it had always been, and that now the greatest impediment to 
an effective, lasting peace – slavery - was the very issue that had compelled the South to 
secede, and for that the South, not Lincoln, was responsible.64 
Nevertheless, the mood in August 1864 was upbeat at the Democratic 
Convention.65 The Dayton Daily Empire on the 27th declared “Delegates and citizens 
from all the States still in the Union are flocking to Chicago on a mission the importance 
of which cannot be overestimated. The fact is everywhere recognized that upon the action 
of that Convention depends the destiny of the American Union.  It has with it the hopes, 
the fears, the aspirations, and the reliance of thirty millions of people.”66 But inside the 
convention, the mood was restive, divided.   
Valladigham had returned.  Lincoln had feared a repeat of Valladigham’s arrest 
would produce the mayhem it had in May of 1863 and allowed him to go unhindered.  At 
the convention, he was both dominant and destructive.  Hoping to quiet discord, Peace 
and War Democrats had divided their influence equally.  Clement Valladigham and a Dr. 
John McElwee were selected to ‘shape the peace platform’ and General George 
McClellan was selected to be the presidential nominee.  The decision to have Peace 
Democrats/Copperheads prescribe to a War Democrat his presidential campaign platform 
was fraught with problems, and those difficulties proved irreconcilable.67 
 
64 Klement, The Copperheads in the Middle West, 234 
65 Ibid, 219-233 
66 Dayton Daily Empire (Ohio), August 27th, 1864, 2 





Joel Silbey notes in A Respectable Minority that over two hundred delegates had 
been selected by their states to attend.  Again, the Purists and Legitimists maneuvered 
against one another, but Silbey notes the Purists were better organized and dominant.  
Delegate August Belmont wrote to a friend that “the Valladigham spirit is rampant & his 
being placed on the Committee of Resolutions will give trouble.”  Silbey also notes a 
curious Republican wryly observed “Valladigham was the hero of the occasion.”  The 
Legitimists supported McClellan, but within that support fractures appeared.  McClellan 
had supported the war – he had commanded Union armies and was indelibly associated 
with the military subjugation of the South.  How could they reconcile his history and their 
hope to end the war?  It was precisely that question that made the Purists more 
obstinate.68  
Jennifer Weber in Copperheads lays the blame for the Democratic failure 
squarely on Valladigham.  His domination of the Committee of Resolutions led to a 
nearly pure Copperhead membership, and the outcome was predictable. Years of 
calcified Democratic principles guided their conclusions, and the platform the committee 
presented was indigestible to the candidate.  Yet, Weber notes the party had been helped 
greatly by the ‘dismal performance of the army’ and that ‘even weary War Democrats 
sounded themes that the peace men had been expounding for more than three years.  This 
moment was the Copperhead’s apex.’  But Weber ends that observation by noting their 
‘success in Chicago left an impression of defeatism that ultimately cost McClellan and 
his party dearly.’69 
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The three-day conference adjourned with the selection of McClellan to lead the 
Democratic ticket.  It is important to note that in the mid-1800s, those vying for 
nomination did not attend conventions – rather, they left the bargaining and wrangling to 
their faithful supporters and stayed comfortably away.  Several days after the convention, 
on September 8th, McClellan submitted his acceptance letter.  In it, he rejected the 
Copperhead platform.  While preferring peace, he understood and supported continuing 
the war. He wrote: 
…I could not look in the face gallant comrades of the army and navy, who 
have survived so many bloody battles, and tell them that their labors and the 
sacrifices of so many of our slain and wounded brethren had been in vain; 
that we have abandoned that for which we have so often periled our lives. 
A vast majority of our people, whether in the army or navy, or at home, 
would, as I would, hail with unbounded joy the permanent restoration of 
peace, on the basis of the Union under the Constitution, without the effusion 
of another drop of blood. But no peace can be permanent without Union…70 
    
  The Copperheads were furious, and on September 14th Valladigham and others 
decided to break with the Democratic ticket and called for a convention in Cincinnati in 
October to nominate another candidate.  Weber notes Valladigham later changed his 
mind and decided, in the interest of unity, to back McClellan, but by then it was too late. 
The Democrats had once again fragmented on the eve of an election.71  
The Democratic Press in Eaton, Ohio on September 15th published McClellan’s 
acceptance letter beneath its daily exhortation for voters to choose McClellan for 
president.  Apparently too late to change the print blocks, the editor in the same issue 
retracted his newspapers endorsement of McClellan: 
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He does not say that he is a peace man, but that while he means, if elected 
to fill the Presidential chair, to use all reasonable means to bring the South 
back into the Union, he will continue the war if needs be.  We cannot for 
the life of us see wherein the General differs from Mr. Lincoln, except it be 
on the abolition question, and even on that subject, the General does not 
state or define his views in the way in which the nominee of a great party 
ought to be unequivocal, literal, and straightforward, in a statement of his 
political principles.72 
 
The fortunes of war began to favor the Republicans.  In early August, Admiral 
Farragut had sailed his Union warships into Mobile Bay, Alabama and seized the port, 
having defeated the Confederate ironclad CSS Tennessee and the three garrisons 
protecting the harbor.  The Union victory closed the last Confederate port on the Gulf of 
Mexico east of the Mississippi.  On September 2nd, General Sherman’s Union army 
captured Atlanta, having reduced and rendered ineffective the Confederate army 
commanded by General John Bell Hood.  In September and October, General Phillip 
Sheridan led his Union forces into the Shenandoah Valley, routed his Confederate 
opponent and reduced the valley to ashes.  At last, the war was going in Lincoln’s favor, 
just in time for the October 1864 elections. 
By far, it was the capture of Atlanta that electrified the country.  To the nation, 
Lincoln formally and equally thanked Admiral Farragut and General Sherman for their 
great accomplishments, as well as the many thousands of soldiers and sailors that had 
secured victory with their blood.73 Privately, after Atlanta fell, Gideon Welles observed 
“this intelligence will not be gratifying to the zealous partisans who have just sent out a 
peace platform. But it is a melancholy and sorrowful reflection that there are among us so 
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many who do not rejoice in the success of the Union arms.”  Welles went on to write “…I 
cannot think these men are destitute of love of country; but they permit party prejudices 
and party antagonisms to absorb their better nature.”74  
Welles also wrote “There is fatuity in nominating a General & warrior on a peace 
platform.”75 That point was clear to General McClellan as he wrote his acceptance letter.  
Beset by personal and party conflicts, McClellan was in a difficult position.   He 
understood, as did the Republicans, the October gubernatorial contests in Ohio, Indiana 
and Pennsylvania would statistically determine the November presidential winner, and 
the war now favored the incumbent. 
  As had it had been throughout the war, newspapers were the primary weapons of 
both parties, and in the three states with gubernatorial contests the papers were 
unrestrained.  In Pennsylvania, The Alleghanian, a Republican paper, published a letter 
that paired ‘the traitor Valladigham’ with McClellan, and claimed both had actively 
conspired with the South.  Further, the letter falsely claimed McClellan had only joined 
the Union army after his offer to serve in the Confederacy had been met with an offer of 
insufficient rank.  Regardless, the author knew ‘his heart was with the South’ and he had 
deliberately thrown the 1862 Peninsula Campaign.76 On September 30th, The Bedford 
Inquirer, also Republican, accused the Copperheads of draft sabotage and called 
McClellan inept.77  The Clearfield Republican, a curiously named Democratic paper, 
endorsed McClellan and disparaged Lincoln.78 The Columbia Democrat on September 
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24th lampooned Lincoln in a poem and assured its readers that Valladigham was now 
fully supporting McClellan.79  
Little was said by either party of the September 21st withdrawal of Fremont from 
the presidential race.  A strident Abolitionist who had broken with the Republicans over 
Lincoln’s slow pace of emancipation and war management, Freemont had always been 
unpopular with the Democrats and they were not sorry to see him go.  The Republicans 
also did not regret his departure. 
The elections in Indiana and Ohio were as much about emancipation as the war.  
The Democrats claimed the Republican war had always been about abolition, and now in 
1864 it was clear to Democrats getting rid of slavery was a Republican precondition for 
restoring the Union.  The Indiana Daily State Sentinel, a Democratic paper, wrote on 
September 26th: 
The Sentinel of this morning takes exception to a speech made by Gov. 
Morton at the Bates House last evening, because he argued that slavery is 
the cause of the war, and that there can be no permanent peace till the 
institution is abolished.  The writer holds, therefore, that Gov. Morton is 
opposed to the old Union, the old Bible and the old God, and in favor of a 
new Union, a new Bible and a new God; and that the writers gentle hints 
that the contest has degenerated into an abolition war are fully justified.80 
 
Most Democratic newspapers euphemistically referred to emancipation as a 
‘constitutional issue’ and avoided mentioning it directly.  To them, Lincoln’s move to 
abolish slavery equated to a willful violation, and therefore a threat, to the Constitution.  
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On September 29th, The Plymouth Weekly Democrat, an Indiana paper, used Lincoln’s 
Niagara Falls letter to make that point: 
Mr. Lincoln, in his manifesto addressed “To whom it may concern” closed 
all lawful and constitutional avenues to Peace and Union, for 
constitutionally, he has no power to exact the terms he prescribed, nor the 
rebels to grant them, nor both to enforce them if granted and accepted… His 
position, therefore – no peace until the Union and Constitution are 
overthrown – and no negotiations for peace except on that revolutionary 
basis.81 
 
 Republican newspapers were not in disagreement.  They agreed the fundamental 
issue of the war was now slavery and saw its eradication as the war’s natural 
consequence.  The Union was winning.  The fall of Atlanta had sounded the death knell 
of the Confederacy, and the northern electorate now knew it.  Nevertheless, as it had been 
throughout the war, parties remained loyal and often exhibited a tenacity that defied the 
circumstances confronting them.  Much remained uncertain. Lincoln and McClellan both 
looked to the soldier vote to give them the margin of victory, but it was Lincoln the 
politician, not McClellan the general, who understood the men in uniform.    
 Democratic newspapers in Pennsylvania, Indiana and Ohio believed McClellan 
alone would claim the soldier vote.  Doris Kearns Goodwin in Team of Rivals notes the 
Democratic hope for a majority military vote relied heavily on soldier memories of 1862, 
when McClellan had shaped the newly assembled army and demonstrated a reluctance to 
unnecessarily expose his men to danger.  On the eve of the November 1864 elections, 
Democratic publisher Manton Marble predicted “We are as certain of two-thirds of that 
vote for General McClellan as that the sun shines.”  Yet it was Lincoln who had spent 
 





time throughout the war with the troops, visiting the wounded in hospitals, the men in 
their Petersburg entrenchments and more.  After defeat and victory, he had been there to 
visit them and lift their spirits.  Further, he had always been more inclined to pardon than 
punish, and the leniency he showed the men was remembered.82  
Uncommon were the extraordinary measures Lincoln took to get soldiers to vote.  
He was confident the soldiers would support him and communicated his hope that the 
army and navy would encourage their men to vote.  Goodwin notes thirteen of the 
northern states allowed absentee ballots, and another four allowed soldiers to ‘vote by 
proxy’, a process that relied on sealed soldier ballots mailed home and carried to the polls 
by trusted friends or election officials.  But some states, to include Indiana, required the 
soldier’s presence.83 Lincoln wrote General Sherman on the 19th of September:   
The State election of Indiana occurs on the 11th of October, and the loss of 
it, to the friends of the Government, would go far toward losing the whole 
Union cause. The bad effect upon the November election, and especially the 
giving the State government to those who will oppose the war in every 
possible way, are too much to risk, if it can be possibly avoided….Indiana 
is the only important State, voting in October, whose soldiers cannot vote 
in the field…This is in no sense an order, but it is merely intended to impress 
you with the importance, to the army itself, of your doing all you safely can, 
yourself being the judge of what you can safely do.84 
 
Lincoln understood the delicate boundaries separating his political machinations 
from actions of clear benefit to the nation.  He had spent the war balancing the two, and 
those complicated navigations had done much to unite his opponents.  His letter to 
Sherman reflected both in curious competition.  He relied on Sherman’s discretion to act, 
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as Sherman best believed, in the interest of the nation.  On October 11th, Gideon Welles 
wrote of his discomfort with what he saw as a dangerous mixing of Republican political 
advantage and national good: 
Much is said and done in regard to the soldiers vote, and many of the states 
have not only passed laws but altered their constitutions to permit it.  The 
subject is one that has not struck me favorably. I have not perhaps given the 
subject the consideration that I ought – certainly not enough to advocate it, 
and yet it seems ungracious to oppose it. Were I to vote on the question at 
all, I should, with my present impressions, vote against it.85 
 
There were more than battle victories and encouraged soldier voting at work 
during the elections.  Frank Klement notes the economy, especially the Midwest 
economy, was good in 1864, benefiting from agricultural sales to the military.  Prices 
went up, workers received better pay, unions were strengthened and the general 
prosperity did much to counter Copperhead messaging.  Also, at work was an aggressive 
Republican campaign to broadly label the Copperheads as treasonous, and to link them to 
both the Sons of Liberty and the Confederates.86 
The October elections went to the Republicans.  Ohio and Indiana resulted in 
sweeping  victories for Lincoln’s allies, giving both states Republican governors and 
significantly increased numbers of Republican representatives in Congress.  Ohio was by 
far the most dramatic, changing from fourteen Democrats and five Republicans in 1862 
to seventeen Republicans and two Democrats in 1864.  Pennsylvania was a closer 
contest, but in the end, it elected a Republican governor and went from an even party split 
in Congress to fifteen Republicans and nine Democrats.  Nicolay and Hay reported the 
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greatest success of the day, to Lincoln, was the adoption of a new constitution in 
Maryland that abolished slavery. They noted the majority was slim, and the victory was 
due in large part to the soldier vote, but it was nevertheless a victory of great importance 
to Lincoln.  It was deeply satisfying to him that a slave state had voluntarily and 
democratically done on one election day what over three years of war still struggled to 
do.87 
October kindled Republican optimism for November.  Gideon Welles noted the 
results on October 12th and felt they went far towards deciding things but was himself 
cautious.  On the 14th he observed Seward “was quite exultant over the elections – feels 
strong and self-gratified.” Seward felt the “administration is wise, energetic, faithful and 
able beyond any of its predecessors.”  Lincoln was more circumspect.  In an address to 
the citizens of Maryland following their decision to abolish slavery, Lincoln reacted to 
continued Democratic criticism: 
I am struggling to maintain the government, not overthrow it.  I am 
struggling, especially, to prevent others from overthrowing it.  I therefore 
say that if I shall live I shall remain President until the 4th of next March; 
and that whoever shall be constitutionally elected therefore, in November, 
shall be duly installed as President on the 4th of March; and that, in the 
interval, I shall do my utmost that whoever is to hold the helm for the next 
voyage shall start with the best possible chance to save the ship.88 
 
Although encouraged by the October returns, Lincoln remained unconvinced 
November would go his way.  In a congratulatory letter to Governor Morton of Indiana 
on October 13th,  Lincoln noted the strong soldier vote that helped win the day for the 
Republicans, but clearly regretted he had not asked Sherman to leave the men on 
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furlough until November.89 The war had been too turbulent, too costly, too long, and his 
opposition had displayed a truculence that only grew as the war went on.  Lincoln was 
disinclined to be optimistic.  In a reflective moment with ‘one of his secretaries’, Lincoln 
said, according to Nicolay and Hay (his secretaries):  “It is singular that I, who am not a 
vindictive man, should always, except once, have been before the people for election in 
canvasses marked for their bitterness.  When I came to Congress it was a quiet time; but 
always, except that, the contests in which I have been prominent have been marked with 
great rancor.”90  In their history of Lincoln, Nicolay and Hay observed that well before 
election day, the electoral winds clearly favored Lincoln, and that all within his cabinet 
were convinced his win was assured, both by the state victories the preceding month and 
by the overwhelming support of the men in uniform, but Lincoln remained solemn. 
The November election was a resounding victory for the Republicans.  It was also 
a stinging rebuke for the Democrats.  The post-election forensics severely indicted 
Valladigham.  Jennifer Weber writes “ …Valladigham’s calls for peace and Union 
coupled with the more extreme assertions by some of his colleagues left him and his 
party quite vulnerable when Republicans reacted to the Democratic challenge.  All 
Democrats became Copperheads – all candidates became Valladigham.”91 Frank Klement 
observes the Copperheads refused to accept the blame for their defeat, and further refused 
to acknowledge the mood of the nation had changed.  Even in early 1865, Democrats 
stubbornly clung to the idea of peace and settlement.92 In a letter to Horace Greeley on 
January 23rd, 1865, Clement Valladigham broached the possibility of a brokered peace 
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with the South. He still believed the South’s armies were ‘formidable’ and he feared the 
possibility of foreign intervention.  He had previously met Greeley in Canada during the 
Niagara Falls fiasco and hoped Greeley might again urge Lincoln to consider negotiations 
with the Confederates.  If he received a response from Greeley, it is not recorded.93 
After that effort failed, James Valladigham noted “Early in April, however, the 
war was unexpectedly brought to a close by the surrender of General Lee.”  He went on 
to describe the celebrations in Dayton after the surrender was announced, and that 
drunken hooligans attacked the Valladigham house that night and threw bricks through 
the windows until chased off by a pistol firing Clement Vallandigham.94 
    -------------------- 
If not October, the November 1864 elections effectively neutralized the 
Copperheads for the remainder of the war.  They did not go away, but they slipped into 
shadows and ceased to openly oppose Lincoln, at least as they had.  They had risen to 
prominence and power with Valladigham as their leader, and when they fell it was 
because of him.  Certainly, there were defections, with Samuel Cox as the most notable.  
But so many remained faithful throughout the war and accepted his political convictions 
without question and it destroyed them. So why was Valladigham so influential? 
Jennifer Weber believes they were never well organized.  Although the 
Copperheads followed leaders like Valladigham, Vorhees and Cox, they were fragmented 
in their messaging and impact across the North.  There was never a national plan.  All 
Copperhead organization was local, and what constituted ‘local’ depended on the region 
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and density of like-minded people.  They thrived in the Midwest, where resentments of 
the Northeast often rivaled any animus Midwesterners had for the South.  In the East, 
what drove a person to join the Copperhead ranks was different in New York than in 
Pennsylvania, or Massachusetts.  When they protested, there was little they could offer as 
a general plan, apart from vague proposals they extrapolated from their complaints.  They 
complained the war was unjust, therefore they were against it and wanted it to stop.  
Precisely how and at what price remained vague, and thus the hollowness of their 
platform gradually revealed itself, especially when the conflict began to show its 
favorable end to all who could and were willing to see it.95 
They also had picked the wrong person to fight with.  Frank Klement writes 
“Lincoln grew with the war; he was a party politician when he was elected president in 
1860, but he was a statesman by the time the war was in its closing days.”  He was a man 
of common origin and could thus identify with the people in ways many of the 
Copperheads never could.  Klement continues “He had the knack of appealing to their 
good sense and their ideals. The public recognized the Copperhead-made charges of 
despotism and slander were out of character….Lincoln’s quality of character, in an 
immeasurable way, contributed to his own re-election and to the recession of the 
Copperhead high tide of 1863.”96 
Joel Silbey sees their fractures and 1864 defeat as inevitable.  They had been 
warned by Stephen Douglas that no American political party had ever successfully 
resisted an American  war in progress.  As the war deepened, and battlefield success and 
 
95 Weber, Copperheads, 216-217 





failure provided opportunities for both parties, it was the Republicans who consistently 
emerged as the doggedly faithful and patriotic faction, and the Democrats who were 
increasingly derided as the opposite.97 Within the Democratic party, the dogmatically 
stubborn Valladigham never recognized the shifting public mood, or else was blinded to 
it by his own rhetoric.  Defections within the party were seen by him as defections from 
Democratic principles, and he remained true to those principles to the very end.  That he 
was surprised by Lee’s surrender at Appomattox, or that he believed in January 1865 that 
foreign powers might interfere in the war, reveals a political naivete attributable only to 
either blind stubbornness, debilitating hubris, or both
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Conclusion 
In the election of 1864, some 45 percent of the Northern electorate voted 
against Abraham Lincoln.  Despite three and one-half years of war and 
extensive efforts by Republicans to unify the North in support of the federal 
government’s war policies, Lincoln’s percentage of the vote and the 
partisan alignment were about the same as they had been in 1860.  Rather 
than voters rallying around the president in a time of crisis, the North 
witnessed ever-intensifying political partisanship and animosity.1   
.   
The concept of nationalism has always had an abstract quality in the United 
States.  Nationalism roughly equates to patriotism, and the idea and practice of patriotism 
has evolved as the nation has evolved.  During the time of the Civil War, to be an 
American had more of a regional distinction, and allegiances to a person’s state of birth 
often trounced any loftier, broader interpretation of patriotism.  The ideas and ethics that 
bonded Virginians, or Alabamians, to one another were often starkly different from the 
glue that held others together. 
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When the South seceded, the new Confederate government recognized that it had 
an immediate need to instill something broader in its people.  It recognized its eleven 
states were threatened with invasion, and the requirement for – and acceptance of -  a 
common, coordinated and enthusiastic defense was their greatest imperative.  To survive, 
southerners had to work as one, and to do so required all of them believing in shared 
principles.  Ultimately, four were chosen, and all four failed.   
 White slave-owning southerners needed to bridge the cultural divide they had 
spent so many years deepening.  To promote southern white unity, both within state 
boundaries and more broadly within the Confederacy, they needed nationalism, and 
badly.  They turned to Christianity, promoting the belief that the South followed God’s 
biblical design more closely than the industrialists of the North.  They believed they were 
the better republicans, and that they alone lived and demonstrated a pure, disinterested 
civic purity reminiscent of ancient republicanism.  They had rejected the commercialism 
they believed had so perverted the North, and that through their diligent agrarianism they 
had avoided greed.  Last, they promoted slavery as a benevolent institution, and claimed 
they were doing the work of God’s shepherd in guiding blacks towards a greater biblical 
understanding of their place in the world.  All had been ideas southerners had used prior 
to the war to defend the institution of slavery from its many critics.  But when tested by 
war, they proved illusory and false, and none of them served to inspire southerners to 
coalesce as the new Confederate nation wanted.  As the war intensified, the South began 
to disintegrate into its pre-war subsets. 
The North was no different.  To be Midwesterner meant something to someone 





notwithstanding, the communities, cities and states of the North were distinctly local, and 
it was reflected in their politics.  They best trusted the people that attended to, and thus 
understood, their needs.  Outside of those concentric circles of trust, rippling away from 
the homestead to the town, city and state, the idea of nationalism took on an increasingly 
abstract quality.  But the one thing northerners could agree on was that they were all 
bound together by the Constitution.  
At the war’s outset, Midwesterners recognized their midwestern world would 
change.  War would damage, if not destroy, traditional trading partnerships with the 
South.  Navigation of the Mississippi River and access to the Gulf of Mexico and ports 
beyond would be threatened if not entirely stopped.  Their markets, once lucrative and 
secure in the South, would now be pushed eastward, and their ability to export 
commodities would depend on rail systems controlled by northeasterners.  They had far 
more in common with the South than they did with the Northeast, and they felt the 
northeasterners, especially the New Englanders, were to blame for the growing conflict.  
Many Midwesterners felt the war itself was a violation of the Constitution, and as its 
disruptions, military setbacks and economic hardships grew, the Copperheads, and 
Valladigham, found a receptive audience.  
Oppositional politics took on an exceptional form during the Civil War.  Northern 
nationalism, and by extrapolation northern unity, was tested in ways the nation had not 
experienced before.  Faced with the unprecedented, Lincoln acted in unprecedented ways.  
Credited now, in 2020, with a profound love and dedication to the nation, it is reflexive to 
conclude his actions were both just and justified.  But in the context of then, from 1861-





closed, dissidents arrested and jailed without trial, martial law routinely imposed and the 
writ of habeas corpus just as routinely suspended.  Lincoln’s actions are viewed now, in 
2020, as necessary steps that enabled a greater good and preserved the nation.  But if 
similar measures were enacted now, in 2020, they would be seen as the death knell of the 
Republic.  Then and now, the concept of nationalism demands more than trust in the 
Chief Executive.  Measures to preserve nationalism require a clear understanding of 
nationalism, and during the Civil War that understanding was by no means universal. 
The Copperheads first protested the war as constitutionally unjust and later, as the 
war ground into its second and third years with horrific losses to both sides, as 
unwinnable.  They wanted the Constitution as it is, and the Union as it was.  In their 
interpretation of the Constitution, a state had the right to determine its course, and if a 
state chose to adopt slavery, that was it’s, not the Federal government’s, choice to make.   
In their eyes, the Constitution was a document purposely left ambiguous and thus flexible 
by the founding fathers.  It did not prohibit a state’s exit from the union, just as it did not 
and had not mandated a state’s entry into the same.  In 1789, a state had to look to its own 
electorate to validate or reject the Constitution, and southern states presumed the right to 
exit the Union was as self-determined as the right to enter.   The Copperheads agreed 
with the slave holders - to a certain point.  They regretted the secession of the southern 
states and believed their grievances were reparable, just as the Union was reparable, if 
only the war that they believed to be constitutionally unjust could be stopped.  
 Throughout the Civil War, Copperheads tested the constitutional boundaries 
separating lawful dissent from sedition, straining pre-war definitions of loyalty and 





the Copperheads did as American’s had done many times before and continue to do today 
– they protested.  Within a constitutional framework strained by the unprecedented 
challenge of civil war, they resisted what they viewed as unconstitutional governmental 
measures.  They railed against what they believed was an unjust war.  When protestors 
were arrested without charge and jailed without trial, they resisted the government within 
the framework of constitutional protections guaranteed to all American citizens.  They 
were enraged by the imposition of martial law in areas that had never threatened 
secession, and they saw the move to subjugate those states that had seceded as a violation 
of a state’s fundamental right of self-determination. Throughout the war they continued 
to rely on and protect the constitutional system their founding fathers had devised, and 
within that system they saw the voting booth as the most effective way to rid themselves 
of a noisome government. 
Lincoln’s concept of nationalism was also constitutionally grounded, but he 
viewed the extraordinary fissure created by eleven departed states as exceptional, and so 
used exceptional measures to adapt the Constitution to the crisis.  In his study of the 
extraordinary ‘relationship’ Lincoln had with the Constitution, Mark E. Neeley notes in 
1862, following the announcement of the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, 
Grosvenor Lowery, one of Lincoln’s key defenders, argued the office of the commander-
in-chief was derived from the Constitution but that the powers of the commander-in-chief 
were “extra-constitutional.” That opinion was challenged in a Boston court that 
interpreted “extra-constitutional” as a soft way of saying “illegal”.2  Lowery defended his 
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point, claiming the powers of the executive are not enumerated in the Constitution in the 
same systematic way the powers of the legislature are, and therefore it requires 
knowledge of things outside of the Constitution to understand executive power and the 
power of the commander-in-chief.3  What was clear at the time, both in Congress and in 
the courts, was that the Civil War presented such exceptional circumstances and 
challenges to all branches of government that “extra-constitutional” measures were 
perhaps warranted, in the absence of any clearer Constitutional definition.   
The space between those for the war and those against it was littered with 
disputed constitutional interpretations.  Absent from the arbitration of those disputes were 
the civil courts themselves, especially the Supreme Court.  Apart from the Ex parte 
Merryman ruling by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Roger Taney, in May of 
1861, in which Taney declared the executive could not suspend the writ of habeas corpus 
without the consent of Congress, the civil judicial system largely conceded its authority 
to the legislative and executive branches and by executive extension, the military.  And in 
the case of Merryman, the executive branch claimed its authority was justly derived from 
the war powers granted the executive in time of national peril, and so ignored the Taney 
ruling.4 
Because of the courts reluctance to assert itself in the many constitutional 
arguments born from the war, the Copperheads navigated disputed constitutional ground 
policed by the Republicans.   Right and wrong, loyalty and disloyalty, what was an 
appropriate expression of nationalism and where that stopped and sedition began – all 
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were decided by their political opponents and enforced by a military controlled by those 
opponents and at war.  Placed in that context, it is easy to find sympathy for the 
frustrations, and to a point the arguments of the Copperheads.  
It is difficult now to reconcile Clement Valladigham’s collusion with Confederate 
agents in 1864.   That act violated what was and is now commonly understood to be 
fundamentally ‘loyal’.  Apart from that significant aberration, Valladigham and the 
Copperheads acted within the constitutional boundaries of what we now regard as 
acceptable civil protest.   What they did during the Civil War and how they did it is 
instructive now.  Their tactics, so bold in 1861-1864, almost seem tame in a modern 
world.  Valladigham and his cohorts were eloquent, and their speeches reflect a 
constitutional reverence uncommon today.  Confronted with gerrymandering, vote 
manipulation, voter intimidation and the ever-present possibility of arbitrary arrest and 
imprisonment, the Copperheads navigated the political landscape with surprising civility. 
 Lincoln exercised executive authority throughout the war that vastly exceeded 
those of his predecessors, and at his death in 1865 those new authorities remained.  They 
became precedents for future presidents to cite, and as citizens our comfort and 
discomfort with those powers is determined by the president who wields them.  The 
enormous power of the executive is disturbing to many Americans in 2020, in large part 
due to a common distrust of the president himself.  Absent in Congress is a persuasive 
oppositional voice, nor is there enough oppositional clout to blunt what are, to so many of 
us, obvious transgressions.  Such is the legacy of Lincoln.  And such is the failure, or 
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